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IP, R.I.P. 
ANDREW GILDEN* 
ABSTRACT 
Death is an inevitably disruptive event. When a famous artist or public 
figure dies, the fallout can be particularly complex and contentious. An 
artist’s surviving family and close friends frequently seek privacy and 
solitude as they process a deeply personal loss, while millions of fans, by 
contrast, seek to widely share, rework, and celebrate the decedent’s 
archive of work. When these very different mourning processes intersect, 
intellectual property laws play a pivotal role in deciding how an artist is 
mourned, commemorated, and remembered.  
This Article reexamines the interests of an artist’s families, friends, and 
other heirs (IP estates) within the IP system. Previous scholarship has 
been nearly uniformly critical of IP estates: IP estates “jealously guard” 
their ancestor’s legacy, “sit back and collect rent,” and put a 
“stranglehold” on the public domain. This Article, by contrast, reveals a 
more diverse and sympathetic set of motivations. Although IP estates do 
often try to restrict fair use and free speech, they also seek to vindicate 
interests otherwise celebrated in our legal culture: remedying 
exploitation, protecting family privacy, and maintaining the dignity of the 
deceased. For the families and friends of individuals in creative fields, IP 
can serve as a valuable tool in managing the messy tasks of mourning and 
moving forward.  
This Article excavates the role of IP in mediating the diverse interests 
of families and fans as they process the death of an artist. Even if the 
conduct of IP estates can be highly questionable from a social welfare 
perspective, recognizing the interests that animate their disputes 
nonetheless can lead to (1) greater common ground among the various 
stakeholders negotiating an artist’s cultural legacy and (2) improved use 
of estate planning to reduce the likelihood of conflict.  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
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INTRODUCTION 
The year 2016 witnessed the deaths of an astonishing number of 
cultural icons: David Bowie, Prince, Leonard Cohen, George Michael, 
Carrie Fisher, Debbie Reynolds, Gene Wilder, Florence Henderson, 
Harper Lee, Elie Wiesel, Muhammad Ali, and many, many others. In the 
wake of this year of great loss—this “year of the reaper”1—how should 
our culture grieve, remember, and commemorate each of their legacies? 
Are there any limits to how to process the loss of someone with 
widespread cultural influence? And who decides the proper way to mourn?  
When artists and other public figures die, two parallel processes begin. 
For most people, the passing of a celebrity sets off a very public 
commemoration, as millions of fans rapidly buy, share, and rework the 
decedent’s archive of work. Mortality has claimed the individual, but the 
music, books, films, and speeches can live on forever. It is easy to forget, 
however, that the decedents’ friends and families need to process the 
deaths of actual human beings they loved apart from the oeuvre that 
constitutes their public legacy. In the midst of the near-constant circulation 
of a deceased artist’s words, voice, and image, the artist’s family and 
friends must negotiate a new day-to-day reality where they can no longer 
interact with their mother, sister, daughter, or best friend. They often want 
what any mourner wants—solitude, privacy, and respect for the difficult 
task of moving forward with their lives.  
Intellectual property laws frequently ensure a clash between these two 
mourning processes. Under copyright and right-of-publicity laws, family 
members of a deceased individual are often tasked with deciding what 
public uses of a decedent’s work or image are lawful at the same time they 
are most acutely grieving their personal losses. Under U.S. copyright law, 
copyright protections subsist for seventy years after the author dies,2 and 
under many states’ right-of-publicity laws, a property right subsists for 
many decades after the death of a celebrity.3 As a result, family members 
who typically inherit these rights (IP estates) have the exclusive right to 
authorize dissemination of their ancestor’s creative works and to control 
commercial uses of their ancestor’s image or likeness. The families and 
                                                
1.  Lisa Respers France, 2016 Celebrity Deaths: A Year of Great Loss, CNN (Dec. 26, 2016, 
12:32 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/22/entertainment/2016-celebrity-deaths. 
2.  17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). 
3.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(g) (2017) (seventy years after death); IND. CODE § 32-
36-1-8 (2017) (100 years after death); TEX. PROP. CODE § 26.012(d) (2017) (fifty years after death). 
But see Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1990) (observing no postmortem right in 
New York). 
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friends of Prince,4 David Bowie,5 and George Michael6 will accordingly 
play a pivotal role in shaping how they and their 2016 cohort are 
remembered in the years to come.  
Postmortem intellectual property accordingly highlights the dual 
meanings of an artist’s legacy. “Legacy” means both “a gift by will 
especially of money or other personal property” (e.g., a bequest) and 
“something transmitted by or received from an ancestor or predecessor or 
from the past” (e.g., the legacy of ancient philosophers).7 IP estates inherit 
a “legacy” from an artist in the first sense that allows them to control the 
broader cultural impact and memory of the artist—a legacy in the second 
sense. In transmitting rights from artists to heirs, IP estates are forced to 
decide when the personal relationships underlying their testamentary 
legacies are paramount and when those relationships must cede to the 
public demands of the decedent’s cultural legacy.  
Although IP estates play a complex and incredibly important role in 
today’s intellectual property regimes, IP scholars have devoted 
surprisingly little attention to them.8 To the extent they have appeared in 
IP scholarship more than fleetingly, they have appeared almost entirely as 
the objects of pointed criticism. 9  They are “capricious” aristocrats; 10 
“misbehaving children”; 11  “trust fund” babies; 12  and “privileged and 
sometimes arbitrary custodians of culture.”13 They “jealously guard” their 
                                                
4.  Jeff Nelson & Jordan Runtagh, The Battle for Prince’s Estate: A Complete List of Who Is 
Staking a Claim to His Millions, PEOPLE (June 27, 2016, 2:45 PM), http://people.com/crime/prince-
estate-battle-list-of-alleged-heirs-who-he-owned-money. 
5.  Daniel Kreps, Details of David Bowie’s Will Revealed, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 30, 2016), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/details-of-david-bowies-will-revealed-20160130. 
6.  Richard Spillett & Alex Matthews, George Michael’s £100m Fortune ‘Will Go to His 
Godchildren,’ DAILYMAIL (Dec. 27, 2016, 4:03 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
4067832/George-Michael-s-100m-fortune-Godchildren.html. 
7.  Legacy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/legacy (last 
visited Aug. 11, 2017). 
8.  The major recent exceptions are scholarship by Professors Eva Subotnik and Tonya Evans. 
See infra notes 24, 37, 280, 285. 
9.  One exception is in Professor Roberta Kwall’s work defending a freely descendible and 
devisable right of publicity, in which she acknowledged the potentially significant emotional interests 
of a celebrity’s heirs in limiting use of a decedent’s image, particularly in highly objectionable 
contexts. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property 
and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 82 (1994). Professor Eva Subotnik’s recent work on the 
intersection between copyright and trusts and estates is also more sanguine about descendible rights, 
though she too expresses concerns about the cultural stewardship practices of IP estates. See infra note 
37 and accompanying text. 
10.  Deven R. Desai, The Life and Death of Copyright, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 219, 258 (2011). 
11.  Id. 
12.  William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 908 (1997). 
13.  Robert Spoo, Ezra Pound’s Copyright Statute: Perpetual Rights and the Problem of Heirs, 
56 UCLA L. REV. 1775, 1827 (2009). 
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ancestor’s legacy,14 “sit back and collect rent,”15 and put a “stranglehold”16 
on what would otherwise be a thriving public domain. Despite being a 
central component of IP regimes and frequently successful litigants and 
lobbyists, IP estates often emerge in scholarship as its black sheep: 
families in chaos, out-of-touch scrooges, and the idle rich.  
This Article takes a different approach and seeks to understand what 
motivates the sometimes restrictive instincts of IP estates. It documents 
and examines the expressed motivations of deceased artists’ families when 
they assert infringement claims against fans, scholars, or other individuals 
with an interest in the deceased artist. Drawing from a broad range of 
litigation-related documents (e.g., briefs, pleadings, depositions, and trial 
transcripts) and related public statements by heirs, this Article reveals a far 
more complex taxonomy of interests than suggested by most portrayals of 
IP estates. Yes, the individuals in these disputes do often inherit great 
sums of money, and yes, they do often try to quell activities that are likely 
fair use, but they also often seek to vindicate interests otherwise often 
celebrated in our legal culture: remedying exploitation, protecting family 
privacy, and maintaining the dignity of the deceased.  
What emerges from this Article’s examination of IP estates is that the 
families of a deceased artist act in many ways like any other family 
working through the death of a relative: they are at times staunchly 
protective of their family member’s memory; they fiercely guard space for 
their own private reflection; they cling to inherited property as a way to 
continue their bonds with a deceased loved one; and they expect others to 
respect and facilitate their processes of mourning. 17  These mourning 
practices are often unpredictable, irrational, inefficient, and can very much 
frustrate the continued dissemination and transformation of the deceased 
artist’s life work. The private mourning of artists’ families thus can be 
sharply at odds with the interests of the millions of fans who have deep 
attachments to the artists’ public personae.  
 Nevertheless, it is far from a simple task to decide in what 
circumstances private or public mourning comes first. Scholars, judges, 
and lawmakers may ultimately and rightfully decide that in many cases the 
private interests of families may need to give way to the expressive 
interests of the broader public, but they should do so based on a conscious 
                                                
14.  Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy and Bess, 
and Unfair Use, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 277, 318 n.209 (2006). 
15.  Desai, supra note 10, at 259. 
16.  RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
DEAD 9 (2010). 
17.  For bereavement literature on “continuing bonds,” see infra note 238 and accompanying 
text. 
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weighing of the actual interests at stake.18 When confronted with similar 
emotional attachments, scholars in other fields (e.g., trusts and estates, 
property law, and family law) have often responded with a sympathetic 
ear. IP scholarship is notable in its contrasting, widespread skepticism. 
It is becoming increasingly untenable for scholars and advocates to 
overlook the perspectives of IP estates. First, technological advances have 
enabled deceased celebrities to virtually live on in the public spotlight. For 
example, Star Wars: Rogue One features an incredibly lifelike CGI 
version of deceased actor Peter Cushing, the 2012 Coachella Festival 
featured a “live” performance by deceased rapper Tupac Shakur, and 
Michael Jackson’s hologram performs nightly in Las Vegas. These 
controversial, but highly lucrative, resurrections are almost entirely in the 
hands of IP estates. Second, there recently have been numerous high-
profile lawsuits involving IP estates, most notably the Blurred Lines19 and 
Stairway to Heaven20 litigations, as well as infringement lawsuits against 
artists Ed Sheeran, Justin Timberlake, and Jay-Z.21 Third, IP estates have 
latched onto the Supreme Court’s 2014 opinion in Petrella v. MGM, Inc.,22 
which effectively allowed lawsuits against uses of copyrighted works that 
had been ongoing for decades prior to the copyright owner’s death.23 
Fourth, since 2013, copyright heirs have the ability to terminate their 
relative’s decades-old lifetime transfers, taking copyright out of the hands 
                                                
18.  See Jeanne Fromer, Should the Law Care Why Intellectual Property Rights Have Been 
Asserted?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 549, 562 (2015) (“[I]t is not always clear exactly what is motivating 
these rights assertions—a desire to preserve the deceased's reputation or privacy or instead a wish to 
capitalize on these copyrighted works as successfully as possible.”).  
19.  See generally Ed Christman, ‘Blurred Lines’ Verdict: How it Started, Why it Backfired on 
Robin Thicke and Why Songwriters Should Be Nervous, BILLBOARD (Mar. 13, 2015), 
http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6502023/blurred-lines-verdict-how-it-started-why-it-
backfired-on-robin-thicke-and. 
20.  See generally Jazz Monroe & Marc Hogan, Led Zeppelin “Stairway to Heaven” Lawsuit 
Win Appealed, PITCHFORK (July 26, 2016), http://pitchfork.com/news/67079-led-zeppelin-stairway-to-
heaven-lawsuit-win-appealed/. 
21.  See Jon Bilstein, Ed Sheeran Sued for Allegedly Copying Marvin Gaye's ‘Let's Get It On’, 
ROLLING STONE (Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/ed-sheeran-sued-for-
allegedly-copying-lets-get-it-on-w433632; Ashley Cullins, Justin Timberlake, Will.i.am Facing 
Copyright Suit Over 'Damn Girl', BILLBOARD (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.billboard.com/articles/ 
business/6882079/justin-timberlake-will-i-am-copyright-suit-damn-girl; Khaleda Rahman, Jay Z Is 
Sued by Egyptian Composer’s Heir over Copyright Claims to Flute Sample in 1999 Hip-Hop Classic 
Big Pimpin’, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 14, 2015, 1:11 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
3198406/Jay-Z-sued-Egyptian-composer-s-heir-copyright-claims-flute-sample-1999-hip-hop-classic-
Big-Pimpin.html. 
22.  134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014). 
23.  See Ashley Cullins, From "Stairway to Heaven" to "Damn Girl": 'Raging Bull' Remains 
Center Stage in Copyright Fights, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Sept. 9, 2016, 6:16 PM), http://www.hollywood 
reporter.com/thr-esq/stairway-heaven-damn-girl-raging-927182; Eriq Gardner, CBS Sued Over 
'Hawaii Five-O' Theme by Composer's Family, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Mar. 20, 2015, 8:17 AM), 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/cbs-sued-hawaii-five-o-783275. 
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of corporate assignees and into the hands of spouses, children, and 
grandchildren.24 For IP reformers looking to respond to problems with the 
current IP landscape or for IP lawyers who must interact or negotiate with 
IP estates on a regular basis, it is crucial to understand what motivates 
artists’ families to assert infringement claims, how these concerns might 
be addressed, and ultimately where there might be some common ground.  
Clashes between IP estates and the public domain—and between 
private and public mourning—trigger difficult and important questions 
about the normative aims of IP regimes: Does IP care about the artist’s 
interpersonal relationships and the conditions under which the author 
operates? Or is cultural progress fundamentally about harvesting and 
disseminating discrete cultural works as widely as possible? The answer to 
these questions have important doctrinal consequences in terms of what 
uses of a copyrighted work are “reasonable,” whether and how IP can be 
inherited and alienated, and what remedies are available for assertions of 
rights holders’ “noneconomic” interests. These answers cannot be 
developed in a vacuum and require a richer and fairer understanding of all 
the actors in the IP system, including artists’ families.  
This Article expressly approaches IP disputes from the perspective of 
the individuals who have—often unwittingly—been given stewardship 
over an artist’s legacy. Part I canvasses the largely negative portrayals of 
IP estates in previous IP scholarship. Part II documents a more 
sympathetic set of interests articulated by IP estates in relation to 
copyright and right of publicity disputes. Part III contrasts the treatment of 
these interests in IP scholarship with scholarship in other areas of law. Part 
IV develops a theory of “parallel mourning,” which acknowledges the 
difficult position in which IP laws place family and friends of deceased 
artists by requiring them to navigate their own grieving processes at the 
same time as the broader public’s very different process. It then suggests 
some practical reforms that both respond to the concerns of IP estates and 
better incorporate estate planning into IP practice. In the absence of an 
estate plan, IP rights often fracture via intestacy, and more deliberate 
estate planning could help reduce conflicts between families and fans and 
underscore that both sides share a strong connection to the deceased artist. 
Postmortem IP, for better or worse, gives tremendous cultural influence to 
artists’ families, and it is crucial not just to criticize their failings, but also 
to set them up to succeed. 
                                                
24.  17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012); see generally Lee-ford Tritt, Liberating Estates Law from the 
Constraints of Copyright, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 109 (2006); Tonya M. Evans, Statutory Heirs Apparent?: 
Reclaiming Copyright in the Age of Author-Controlled, Author-Benefiting Transfers, 119 W. VA. L. 
REV. 297 (2017). 
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I. SCHOLARLY CRITICISM OF IP ESTATES 
IP estates play a tremendously important role within contemporary IP 
governance, yet they have received surprisingly sparse treatment within 
the rich field of IP scholarship. Although there is voluminous scholarship 
dedicated to the extended postmortem duration of copyright protections at 
the end of the twentieth century,25 and a smaller, but significant, body of 
scholarship debating postmortem publicity rights, surprisingly little 
attention has focused on the actual individuals who receive the direct 
benefits of these extended terms of protection. Moreover, despite scholarly 
efforts to better understand the actual motivations of creators and 
inventors who are meant to be spurred into action and rewarded by IP 
rights,26 relatively little empirical work has focused on the IP estates that 
wield these rights. And to the extent that IP estates have been expressly 
featured in scholarly work, their treatment has been overwhelmingly 
negative. This section will summarize the marginal position of IP estates 
within IP scholarship. It first situates IP estates within broader scholarly 
debates about IP protections and then turns to their express treatment 
within IP scholarship. 
 
 
 
 
A. Postmortem Rights and IP Theory 
Estates play a particularly significant role in at least two areas of IP.27 
Under federal copyright law, copyright protections for individually 
                                                
25.  More specifically, a major catalyst for an explosion in contemporary IP scholarship was 
the passage of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act in 1998, which extended all terms of 
protection by an additional twenty years and was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court in 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). Pub. L. No. 105–298, 112 Stat. 2827, and later codified in 
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. 
26.  See KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW 
IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (2012); JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, 
INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2015); Symposium, Values, Questions, And 
Methods in Intellectual Property, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 549 (2016).  
27.  Other areas of intellectual property do sometimes involve family successors and issues of 
postmortem ownership, but typically not in ways that trigger the range of emotional attachment and 
cultural stewardship challenges discussed in this Article. The patent term of protection (twenty years 
from the filing date of the application) is much shorter than the copyright term (life plus seventy 
years), meaning that postmortem patent only arises if the inventor dies during that twenty-year period. 
Trademark protections are potentially perpetual, meaning that trademark rights could descend across 
generations for all time. However, trademark protections only endure so long as the mark is used in 
commerce, meaning that trademark control will be tied closely to control over the businesses with 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss3/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] IP, R.I.P.   647 
 
 	
authored works endure for the life of the author, plus an additional seventy 
years.28  Under the laws of many states, the right of publicity endures 
several decades beyond the life of the person (identity holder) whose 
name, voice, and image is protected against advertising, trade, or other 
commercial uses.29 Both sets of rights are typically devisable by will or 
trust and subject to intestate succession, 30  meaning that the holders of 
copyright or publicity rights will often be family members who survive the 
author or identity-holder during the postmortem terms of protection.  
Even though both IP regimes extend significant power to successor 
rights holders, such power is only weakly justified by IP theory. Although 
debates over the foundational justifications for IP protections remain 
heated among scholars, estates have a fairly tenuous claim under any 
dominant theory of protection. This section will briefly summarize the 
position of IP estates within the most commonly cited theories of 
copyright and publicity rights. 
There are longstanding and ongoing heated debates among scholars 
about whether copyright law is justified by utilitarian or deontological 
concerns. 31  Under the utilitarian approach, which generally dominates 
American copyright law, copyright law provides an economic incentive 
for authors to invest time and energy into the creation of original works of 
                                                                                                           
which the mark is associated. For a discussion of family businesses and intergenerational transfers, see 
infra notes 205–207 and accompanying text. To the extent that trademark law protects celebrities 
against false indications of sponsorship or association, this strain of trademark law is functionally a 
subset of the right of publicity, which protects against unauthorized uses of a celebrity’s name, image, 
voice, and likeness in advertising, without additionally requiring consumer confusion. See, e.g., ETW 
Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (addressing overlapping Lanham Act and state 
law publicity claims for use of Tiger Woods’ image in commemorative painting); White v. Samsung 
Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (addressing overlapping Lanham Act and state law 
publicity claims for use of a robot version of Vanna White in a Samsung advertisement); see generally 
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 1161 (2006) (explaining the overlap between right of publicity and trademark laws). 
28.  17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). 
29.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (2017) (seventy years postmortem); IND. CODE § 32-
36-1-0.2 (2017) (100 years postmortem); TEX. PROP. CODE § 26.001 (2017) (fifty years postmortem). 
For a state-by-state summary of right of publicity laws, including differences in duration, see 
ROTHMAN’S ROADMAP TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, http://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/ (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2017). 
30.  See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2012) (“The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in 
whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will 
or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.”); CAL. CIV. CODE § 
3344.1(b) (2017) (“The rights recognized under this section are property rights, freely transferable or 
descendible, in whole or in part, by contract or by means of any trust or any other testamentary 
instrument . . . .”). 
31.  See Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328 (2015) 
(criticizing “faith-based” deontological claims to IP protections); Robert P. Merges, Against 
Utilitarian Fundamentalism, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 681 (2017) (pushing back against Lemley’s 
critique). 
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authorship; by prohibiting the unauthorized copying and distribution of an 
author’s work, copyright allows authors to recoup the costs of creation and 
grow the stock of creative works available for public consumption.32 By 
contrast, under the deontological or natural rights approaches more 
dominant in Europe, copyright protections are justified by an intrinsic 
connection between authors and their work. 33  This connection might 
reflect Lockean labor-desert theory, whereby authors mix their labor with 
intellectual resources and obtain private property in the fruits of such 
laboring, 34  or Hegelian personhood theories, whereby property rights 
recognize that creative works are an extension of the author’s 
personality. 35  Although each of these dominant theories suggests a 
somewhat differently scoped property right, the important point of 
commonality is that they all focus on the author; the living, working 
author is the social actor who needs to be nudged under utilitarian 
approaches or recognized and protected under natural rights approaches.36 
Because authors dominate all foundational theories of copyright, the 
interests of family members and other successors-in-interest are, at most, 
incidental to protecting the interests of the author. If copyright is meant to 
incentivize creation, postmortem protections would seem to provide a 
valuable property right to individuals who are not engaging in creative 
pursuits (e.g., the children of creators). Some scholars and lawmakers 
have argued that the ability to leave behind a valuable asset to care for 
surviving family members might provide an additional incentive to 
authors,37 but, again, the focus remains on what motivates the author—not 
on the needs or desires of the surviving family. Under natural rights 
theories, it is similarly difficult to justify the interests of surviving family 
members—they have not mixed their intellectual labor with external 
                                                
32.  See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (“By 
establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic 
incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”). 
33.  See ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS 
LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 37–52 (2010). 
34.  See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 31–67 (2011); Wendy J. 
Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of 
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540–83 (1993); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of 
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 296–330 (1988). 
35.  See Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
609 (1993); Hughes, supra note 34, at 330–65; Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 
STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).  
36.  See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, The Core of Copyright: Authors, Not Publishers, 52 HOUS. L. 
REV. 613 (2014). 
37.  See Eva E. Subotnik, Copyright and the Living Dead?: Succession Law and the 
Postmortem Term, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 77 (2016); see also 141 CONG. REC. 6553 (1995) (statement 
of Senator Hatch that “copyrights in valuable works are too often expiring before they have served 
their purpose of allowing an author to pass their benefits on to his or her heirs”). 
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resources nor are the creative works they control an extension of their 
personalities. 38  Natural rights theories may justify strong control over 
creative works by the author, but they would seem to cut against similar 
control by third parties after the author’s death.39 
Surviving families play a similarly marginal role in theoretical 
justifications for the right of publicity.40 Although numerous scholars are 
highly skeptical about the need for publicity rights at all,41 publicity rights 
have been justified on similar bases as copyright protections: (1) as an 
incentive for individuals to cultivate a valuable celebrity/commercial 
identity; (2) as recognizing natural rights in the fruits of such commercial 
cultivation; and (3) as protecting the identity holder’s autonomy and 
dignity against unauthorized commercialization.42 As with copyright law, 
it is difficult to justify postmortem publicity rights to the benefit of 
surviving family members under an incentive or labor theory,43 except 
perhaps as incidental to the interests of the identity holder.44  
Under a dignitary/autonomy theory of protection, there has been some 
measured support for protecting the independent interests of surviving 
family members. Professor Jennifer Rothman is “not convinced that a 
postmortem right of publicity should exist,” but acknowledges that 
surviving relatives “might have their own identity-based and dignitary 
interests in preventing the commercialization of their loved one’s image . . 
                                                
38.  See Desai, supra note 10, at 245–54; Lionel Bently, R. v The Author: From Death Penalty 
to Community Service, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 99 (2008) (“The creative link between an author and 
her work may justify protection during that author's life, but thereafter an earlier author's claim should 
readily give way to the needs of subsequent authors.”). Natural rights scholars will sometimes carve 
out a narrow space for the economic dependents of the author.  
39.  See Bently, supra note 38, at 101 (“The idea of authorship points, as much to a reduction 
in that term (to life) as to its further extension.”). 
40.  Most arguments in favor of the survivability of publicity rights have centered on their 
formal classification as “property rights,” which are generally understood as descendible. See 
generally Joshua C. Tate, Immortal Fame: Publicity Rights, Taxation, and the Power of Testation, 44 
GA. L. REV. 1, 19–20 n.107–09 (2009) (surveying literature supporting and opposing a descendible 
right of publicity). 
41.  See, e.g., Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and 
Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 125 (1993); F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a Stooge: The 
“Transformativeness” Test for Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim 
Against Distribution of a Work of Art, 27 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 1, 62 (2003); Mark P. McKenna, The 
Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 225 (2005). 
42.  Jennifer E. Rothman, The Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185, 237 (2012) 
(outlining theories). 
43.  See Madow, supra note 41; Tate, supra note 40, at 23 (“[E]ven if the prospect of inter 
vivos publicity rights encouraged celebrities (or would-be celebrities) to work harder, it does not 
follow that making those rights devisable or descendible would have substantially increased that 
incentive.”). 
44.  See Rothman, supra note 42, at 239 (“Although I am highly skeptical of the incentive 
rationale for publicity rights, if we accept for purposes of this discussion that it has some legitimacy, 
then postmortem rights might provide some, though no doubt a minimal, additional incentive.”). 
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. .”45 For example, she suggests that the Martin Luther King, Jr. estate 
might have legitimately objected “if people had profited from making 
inflatable sex dolls of him upon his death.”46 Professor Roberta Kwall has 
recognized similar interests of surviving family members in preventing 
objectionable portrayals of the deceased individual. 47  These more 
sympathetic treatments of postmortem publicity rights, however, are fairly 
abbreviated and touch on only a few specific examples. 
B.  Scholarly Narratives  
The most extensive, express treatment of IP estates appears in critical 
scholarship by Professors Deven Desai, Robert Spoo, William Patry, Paul 
Saint-Amour, and Olufunmilayo Arewa.48 Each of these scholars critiques 
IP estates for restrictive conduct that limits potentially valuable speech and 
expression by third parties. 49  What emerges as a byproduct of these 
important critiques, however, are three distinctly negative narratives about 
IP estates. 
The first narrative is the “slothful heir.” Unlike the author who actually 
engages in the creative activities that IP laws are meant to foster, the 
author’s spouses, children, and grandchildren have done nothing to 
deserve—yet feel strangely entitled to—the lucrative revenue streams that 
come from lengthy postmortem IP terms. In large part due the dubious 
incentives rationale for awarding rights to heirs, Professor Desai strongly 
opposes any postmortem copyright protections: “Unlike authors who labor 
and pour their being into a work, their children and their children’s 
                                                
45.  Rothman, supra note 42, at 237. 
46.  Id. at 238. 
47.  Kwall, Right of Publicity, supra note 9, at 83. Kwall discusses Hicks v. Casablanca 
Records, which concerned the portrayal of author Agatha Christie “as an emotionally unstable woman, 
who, during her eleven-day disappearance, engages in a sinister plot to murder her husband's mistress, 
in an attempt to regain the alienated affections of her husband.” 464 F. Supp. 426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 
1978). 
48.  See also Kate O’Neill, Copyright Law and the Management of J.D. Salinger’s Literary 
Estate, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19 (2012) (arguing that any dignity or privacy interest Salinger 
held in his copyrighted work does not extend to his heirs). 
49.  Professor Eva Subotnik is more supportive of postmortem copyright protections than the 
scholars mentioned above, but her support for postmortem protections is tied to the deceased author’s 
freedom of disposition and the benefits that come from knowing that your testamentary wishes will be 
heeded and your desired loved ones will inherit valuable property. See Subotnik, supra note 37, at 94. 
She largely agrees with criticisms lodged at the estates who wield these rights, but argues that these 
criticisms should be aimed at poor stewardship decisions by particular heirs, and not at the basic 
concept of postmortem rights. Id. at 121. Additionally, as discussed in the previous section, Professors 
Rothman and Kwall have expressed some more measured support for the potential independent 
dignitary interests of family members wielding postmortem publicity rights. See supra notes 44–47. 
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children simply sit back and collect rent . . . .”50 Professor Patry similarly 
finds lengthy copyright terms difficult to justify based on an incentive 
rationale and instead frames copyright expiration as “impoverishing the 
trust funds of composers’ grandchildren.”51 In a similar vein, according to 
Professor Saint-Amour, “the high prices and restricted access maintained 
by the estate can increase the elite glamour and apparent vitality of the 
cultural legacy.”52 IP estates “become so invested in strategies of legal and 
financial self-perpetuation that they grow distanced from the memory or 
intentions of the writers to whom they largely owe their existence . . . .” 53 
Professor Arewa criticizes the George Gershwin estate for tending to 
“authorize performances that gave the most promise of financial return or 
favorable publicity, with less regard for quality or integrity.”54 Under this 
first narrative, IP estates are in it just for the money—they care for nothing 
beyond a reliable stream of licensing revenues. They are greedy rent-
seekers; they are the “idle rich.”55 
The second narrative characterizes IP estates as mad, unruly tyrants. 
They exert an “iron grip” on their ancestor’s image and works and make it 
at best highly uncertain and at worst highly unlikely that scholars and 
subsequent authors can obtain licenses to proceed with their work.56 Along 
these lines, Professor Spoo has been particularly critical of Stephen Joyce, 
the grandson of Irish author James Joyce—“[p]robably the most fiercely 
vigilant and obstructive modernist estate in recent years. . . .”57 The Joyce 
estate has refused permission for numerous scholarly and creative projects 
about James Joyce,58 and Professor Spoo’s response has been scathing: 
Armed with a few wasting copyrights and some spare moral rights, 
and what personal authority he can command, Mr. Joyce has tilted 
repeatedly at the academic and pop-culture windmills which, he 
feels, are making a commodity of a beloved family member. Mr. 
Joyce’s efforts have not been without a certain quixotic integrity, 
but their strangely antic and belated quality serves to remind us that, 
                                                
50.  Desai, supra note 10, at 259; see also Arewa, supra note 14, at 320 (arguing that because 
“[h]eirs and legal successors are in most instances not creative . . . incentives to create [are] far more 
tenuous than such justifications in relation to creators.”). 
51.  Patry, supra note 12, at 908. 
52.  PAUL K. SAINT-AMOUR, THE COPYWRIGHTS 128 (2003). 
53.  Id. at 211. 
54.  Arewa, supra note 14, at 321 
55.  Patry, supra note 12, at 907. 
56.  Spoo, supra note 13, at 1824. 
57.  Spoo, supra note 13, at 1825. 
58.  See, e.g., Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (denying motion to 
dismiss lawsuit against the Joyce estate for copyright misuse). 
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in the normal course of culture, the protests of such an individual 
would not command much attention.59  
He has similarly critiqued the estates of T.S. Eliot and Samuel Beckett for 
“obstructionist behavior” against biographers and translators of the 
authors’ work. 60  Professor Desai similarly observes that “[a]uthors’ 
children can be capricious or even malicious as they exert control over 
copyrighted material,”61 and points to the estates of Joyce, Eliot, Beckett, 
Tolkien, as wells as J.M. Barrie, J.D. Salinger, Sylvia Plath, and Bertolt 
Brecht, who exhibit an almost “fetishistic” attachment to their ancestors’ 
legacies.62  
This vision of the iron-fisted, yet mercurial, heir has also been 
broadened to chaotic families struggling to maintain any semblance of a 
coherent management strategy. Rather than “dutiful children” responsibly 
managing their parents’ work, Desai characterizes IP owners like the 
Martin Luther King, Jr. and J.R.R. Tolkien estates as “in-fighting adults 
who deny others access to work and/or disagree about what works can and 
cannot be made or released to the public.”63 This narrative of the unruly 
family has emerged more recently in media coverage of the Marvin Gaye 
family and litigation concerning the hit song Blurred Lines.64  
The third narrative might be characterized as the censor—the author’s 
family as the enemy of the public domain. Of particular note in this 
category is the estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., which has exerted a 
“stranglehold”65 on the use of King’s likeness and famous speeches in 
significant cultural works such as the film Selma.66 Family members often 
serve as the gatekeepers to the deceased author’s work, and they are 
                                                
59.  Robert Spoo, Three Myths for Aging Copyrights: Tithonus, Dorian Gray, Ulysses, 31 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 77, 108 (2012); see also SAINT-AMOUR, supra note 52, at 157 (describing 
the Joyce estate’s “more capricious” denials of permission). 
60.  Spoo, supra note 13, at 1822–25. 
61.  Desai, supra note 10, at 258. 
62.  Id. at 251; see also Warren Manger, Martin Luther King's Family Have Milked his Legacy 
and He'd Feel Betrayed by Them, MIRROR (Feb. 1, 2015, 9:04 PM), http://www.mirror.co.uk 
/news/world-news/martin-luther-kings-family-milked-5087665 (“Now people see the name Martin 
Luther King and one of the things they think about is his loser children who are trying to profiteer in 
any way possible from his contribution.”). 
63.  Desai, supra note 10, at 259. 
64.  See, e.g., Shekhar Bhatia, Marvin Gaye’s Family in Ugly Feud After $7.4m “Blurred 
Lines” Payout, DAILYMAIL (Mar. 25, 2015, 11:28 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
3008499/Marvin-Gaye-s-family-ugly-feud-7-4m-Blurred-Lines-payout-widow-accuses-penniless-
sisters-picking-bones-say-hated-like-this.html.  
65.  MADOFF, supra note 16, at 9. 
66.  Timothy B. Lee, The Crazy Reason Selma Doesn't Use the Actual Words from MLK's 
Speeches, VOX, (Jan. 13, 2015, 4:50 PM), http://www.vox.com/2015/1/13/7540027/selma-copyright-
king-speeches. 
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frequently criticized for placing their own desires over the interests of 
other authors and the general public interest in the decedent. Under this 
view, to put it plainly, the Joyce family’s private life is “no one’s fucking 
business.”67  
Professor Arewa is particularly critical of the George Gershwin estate’s 
requirement that any stage performances of Porgy and Bess be cast solely 
with black actors. Even though Gershwin borrowed and reworked African 
American cultural traditions, similar racial reworkings (à la Hamilton) are 
not authorized for later authors.68 “Gershwin family restrictions on uses of 
Porgy and Bess substantially affect cultural meaning in preventing any 
reinterpretation of this work, which now represents a seminal ‘high’ 
culture depiction of African-Americans and African-American culture.”69 
The Gershwin estate has placed “respect for the Gershwin image and 
music” above and beyond the “artistic practices” that Gershwin himself 
embodied. 70  As similarly articulated by Professor Spoo, “[g]enetic 
connection is no guarantee of literary sensitivity.”71 heirs are “privileged 
and sometimes arbitrary custodians of culture.”72  
These critical narratives about IP estates often are closely tied up in the 
frequent legislative coalition between IP estates and media companies, 
publishers, and other corporate intermediaries.73 Desai points to the long 
                                                
67.  D.T. Max, The Injustice Collector: Is James Joyce’s Grandson Suppressing Scholarship?, 
NEW YORKER, June 19, 2006 (quoting Stephen Joyce), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006 
/06/19/the-injustice-collector. 
68.  A similar, and perhaps even more persuasive, critique has been lodged at the estate of 
Margaret Mitchell, which prohibited reworkings of Gone With The Wind that involved interracial or 
homosexual sex or depicted Scarlett O’Hara dying. Spoo, supra note 13, at 1824 n.254; SAINT-
AMOUR, supra note 52, at 210–14. See generally SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 
1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding fair use in the novel The Wind Done Gone, which retold the Mitchell 
story from the perspective of a mixed-race slave). 
69.  Arewa, supra note 14, at 311. Professor Madoff is similarly critical of efforts by the John 
Wayne estate to prevent the use of Wayne’s likeness on gay-themed greeting cards. MADOFF, supra 
note 16, at 138–39. 
70.  Arewa, supra note 14 at 317–18. 
71.  Spoo, supra note 13, at 1827. 
72.  Id. 
73.  See, e.g., Patry, supra note 12, at 908 (“Instead of protecting authors, these [term 
extension] proposals are heavily weighted in favor of distributors such as publishers. Instead of 
encouraging living authors to create new works for the benefit of the public, term extension is being 
pushed by the estates of long deceased authors.”); Arewa, supra note 14, at 282 n.3 (noting the 
Gershwin estate’s involvement in copyright term extensions and in the subsequent Eldred v. Ashcroft 
litigation); see also Joyce Slaton, A Mickey Mouse Copyright Law?, WIRED (Jan. 13, 1999, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/1999/01/a-mickey-mouse-copyright-law/ (quoting Eric Eldred who stated, 
“This is not an instance of wanting to take money out of authors' pockets . . . The only people who will 
benefit from this act are distant heirs of the author and publishing companies.”); Donald A. Barclay, 
Shouldn’t There Be a Time Limit on Mickey’s Copyright, CONVERSATION (Feb. 10, 2016), 
http://theconversation.com/shouldnt-there-be-a-time-limit-on-mickeys-copyright-53788 (“The chief 
criticism to the [Copyright Term Extension Act], as expressed by the likes of academic and attorney 
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tradition in copyright reform—and the consistent expansion of rights with 
each new Copyright Act—of using widows and children as “props that 
help hide the true motivations at work.”74 Longer and stronger copyright 
protections typically inure to the benefit of corporate licensees and 
assignees, who are typically unconstrained by physical mortality, and 
framing copyright expansion in terms of protecting wives and children 
tends to be a more politically palatable way of “extracting rent in a 
parasitic way.” 75  According to Professor Saint-Amour, “[n]aming the 
Copyright Term Extension Bill after the late Congressman Sonny Bono, a 
former singer-songwriter who had been killed in a ski accident, was both a 
rhetorically brilliant and a philosophically revealing tactic . . . .”76  
In the right of publicity context, Professor Mark Bartholomew has 
argued that expanded postmortem protections have not been the result of 
increased concern for the privacy and well-being of decedents’ families; 
instead, these rights have emerged from an increasingly commoditized 
understanding of celebrity and a “successful political coalition” of “the 
famous, their heirs, and the licensing companies.”77 A person’s “celebrity” 
value can be quantified, securitized, sold, and assigned; the descendibility 
of publicity rights is merely one of the sticks in the alienable property 
interest celebrity has become.78 Any “egalitarian” promise of protecting all 
surviving families is merely legislative “window dressing, trying to sell 
their constituents on a new law really meant to protect a rarefied few.”79 
Particularly in light of this overwhelming scholarly skepticism, IP 
estates have fared, by contrast, remarkably well in legislatures and courts. 
As mentioned above, they have been instrumental in major copyright 
reforms such as the Copyright Term Extension Act and in Supreme Court 
cases affirming Congress’s power to extend and revive copyright 
protections. 80  They also have successfully (though not universally) 
                                                                                                           
Lawrence Lessig, is that Congress’ retroactive extension of copyright terms benefits a handful of 
corporations like Disney and the heirs of commercially successful artists . . . .”). 
74.  Desai, supra note 10, at 233. 
75.  Desai, supra note 10, at 234; see also id. at 226 (“To support the extension, [Senator] 
Hatch needed to move his audience away from dead authors to a more compelling image, so he turned 
to pathos and a tale of a dead father and his industrious daughter.”). 
76.  SAINT-AMOUR, supra note 52, at 122. 
77.  Mark Bartholomew, A Right is Born: Celebrity, Property, and Postmodern Lawmaking, 44 
CONN. L. REV. 301, 357 (2011). 
78.  Bartholomew, supra note 77, at 341. 
79.  Bartholomew, supra note 77, at 355. 
80.  See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. 6551 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch regarding Copyright Term 
Extension Act); S. Hrg. 104-817, at 58–59 (testimony by Henri Mancini’s widow); id. at 65–66 
(testimony by Schoenberg’s grandson testimony); Brief of Amici Curiae Association of American 
Publishers in Support of Respondent, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618). 
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obtained postmortem right of publicity protections through litigation81 and 
lobbying. 82  And juries have proven receptive to infringement claims 
brought by individuals who had no direct participation in the creation of 
the allegedly infringed subject matter. Most notably, in 2015, a jury 
rendered a $7.5 million verdict against Robin Thicke and Pharrell 
Williams in favor of Marvin Gaye’s heirs. The jurors found that the #1 hit 
song, “Blurred Lines,” was substantially similar to the Gaye classic “Got 
to Give it Up,” based not upon similarities in lead melody or lyrics, but 
seemingly instead based upon similarities in “rhythmic and harmonic 
footprint” and the overall “vibe and feel” of the funk/R&B genre Gaye 
employed.83 The verdict—along with the Gaye family—has been widely 
criticized for misapplying and distorting music copyright. 84  In another 
recent lawsuit, members of the rock group Led Zeppelin managed to 
successfully defeat an infringement action claiming that the classic song, 
“Stairway To Heaven,” infringed the song “Taurus,” written by the late 
musician Randy California, who had toured with Led Zeppelin in the late 
1960s.85 Notably, even though the jury did not find infringement and the 
plaintiff’s lawyer was repeatedly admonished for misbehavior during the 
trial, the judge nonetheless denied Led Zeppelin’s request for attorney’s 
fees based on the plaintiff’s “honorable motivation” in bringing the suit. 86 
“Once the media hype and tangential distractions are stripped away, what 
remains is an objectively reasonable claim motivated by a desire to 
recognize Randy California’s musical contribution.”87 
                                                
81.  See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Social Change v. Am. Heritage Prods., 296 
S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982). 
82.  Compare, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3344.1 (2017) (providing postmortem publicity rights) 
with Veto Message from John Lynch, Governor of N.H. (June 12, 2012), http://mediacoalition.org/file 
s/legislation/new-hampshire-sb175-veto-message.pdf. 
83.  Toni Lester, Blurred Lines—Where Copyright Ends and Cultural Appropriation Begins—
The Case of Robin Thicke Versus Bridgeport Music and the Estate of Marvin Gaye, 36 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 217, 230–31 (2014). 
84.  Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, Squelching Creativity, SLATE (Mar. 12, 2015 
12:27 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/03/_blurred_line 
s_verdict_is_wrong_williams_and_thicke_did_not_infringe_on.html; Noah Feldman, ‘Blurred Lines’ 
and Bad Law, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Mar. 12, 2015 1:07 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/article 
s/2015-03-12/-blurred-lines-and-bad-law; Wendy Gordon, How the Jury in the ‘Blurred Lines' Case 
Was Misled, CONVERSATION (Mar. 17, 2015 5:47 AM), http://theconversation.com/how-the-jury-in-
the-blurred-lines-case-was-misled-38751. 
85.  Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 2:15-CV-03462-RGK-AGR, 2016 WL 6674985 (C.D. Cal. 
Aug. 8, 2016). 
86.  The attorney was subsequently suspended by the Pennsylvania bar for his misconduct in a 
separate copyright action. See Ashley Cullins, Music Publisher Denied Legal Fees Award for 
“Stairway to Heaven” Trial, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Aug. 8, 2016, 6:24 PM), 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/music-publisher-denied-legal-fees-918170. 
87.  Skidmore, No. 2:15-CV-03462-RGK-AGR, 2016 WL 6674985 at *4. 
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This disconnect between IP scholarship and doctrine suggests that IP 
estates are presenting arguments, evidence, and stories that resonate with 
legal decision makers but so far have not resonated with scholars. 
Something is happening in courtrooms and legislatures that either has 
largely escaped the attention of scholars or nonetheless has failed to 
trigger their sympathies. The remainder of this article will begin to fill in 
this gap and surface what interests are being expressed by IP estates when 
they assert their copyright and publicity rights.  
II. ESTATE NARRATIVES 
There is wide agreement that the traditional justifications for 
intellectual property rights have only relatively weak application to an 
artist’s heirs. Nonetheless, the litigation and lobbying successes of these 
individuals signals that there are interests at play that do not neatly fit into 
the standard trio of utilitarian/Lockean/Hegelian theories, yet resonate 
with key players in the IP ecosystem. This section carefully examines the 
arguments and narratives deployed by IP heirs in asserting their rights. 
Through examining the rhetoric of IP estates, it sheds greater light on what 
interests motivate IP heirs’ actions, which of those interests resonate with 
judges and juries, and accordingly what interests are actually shaping the 
development of IP doctrines.  
The following subsections survey a broad range of litigation 
documents, judicial opinions, legislative records, and published 
interviews, and extract at least five categories of narratives that IP heirs 
repeatedly invoke: (1) ensuring proper credit for the deceased artist; (2) 
remedying exploitation of the deceased artist; (3) family privacy; (4) the 
deceased artist’s reputational purity; and (5) children’s right to inherit a 
family member’s legacy. These themes are often interwoven and combine 
with other interests that are decidedly more economic in nature. I should 
note that many IP disputes brought by heirs—like IP disputes involving 
living creators—are ultimately straightforward commercial disputes about 
contract terms and corresponding revenue sharing and do not explicitly 
touch on the more emotion-driven themes explored below. 
There admittedly are significant limits in relying on statements 
produced in connection with legal disputes—particularly statements that 
have been filtered through legal counsel for strategic purposes. Statements 
about emotional attachment or mourning or legacy preservation might 
sound sympathetic and may resonate with a decision maker, but this does 
not mean that they are sincere. Regardless of whether the statements are 
sincere, however, they nonetheless are operative. The rhetoric deployed by 
IP estates, even if it is difficult to square with foundational IP policies, is 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss3/3
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presented to legal decision makers and ultimately shapes the development 
of IP doctrines. There is rich ongoing debate about the legitimacy of 
noneconomic motivations for asserting IP claims, and the repeated 
invocation of noneconomic interests by IP estates further pressures IP 
decision makers to acknowledge the moral and ethical work that IP 
doctrines are already doing.88 Even when viewed skeptically, this rhetoric 
should be taken seriously.  
Additionally, the repeated—and perhaps surprisingly coherent—
deployment of privacy, dignity, and equality narratives by IP estates is in 
tension with their dominant portrayal as greedy rent-seekers driven solely 
by windfall profits. It certainly would be naive to dismiss the economic 
stakes in the disputes discussed below, but IP estates frequently act at odds 
with their own rational financial interests and refuse potentially lucrative 
licensing opportunities. They are neither greedy rent-seekers nor irrational, 
quixotic despots; they are a diverse group of individuals with a broad mix 
of economic and noneconomic interests. 89  Even if scholars ultimately 
think these interests are insufficient bases for IP rights, these interests are 
triggering litigation, shaping IP doctrine, and driving outcomes in ways 
that should not be ignored. The debate about IP’s normative thrust at the 
very least should be waged with fuller awareness of the actual competing 
private and public interests presented to judges, juries, and lawmakers.  
A. Ensuring Proper Credit 
Heirs often argue that deceased artists were in some way unfairly 
treated during their lives, and they seek to vindicate and prevent the 
further exploitation of those artists now that they are in a position to sue. 
Through litigation and advocacy, IP protections allow family members to 
ensure that a deceased artist finally receives the recognition and fair 
treatment they have long been denied. 
Several high-profile lawsuits brought by IP estates seek to ensure that 
the deceased author receive credit for his or her contribution to major 
works of popular culture. Although estates are sometimes accused of 
“smelling money” in the form of an infringement lawsuit, they repeatedly 
push back that the accused infringer did not adequately acknowledge their 
relative’s substantial influence. The Marvin Gaye heirs, for example, 
                                                
88.  See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco & David Fagundes, Moral Psychology of Copyright 
Infringement, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2433 (2016) (arguing that copyright infringement lawsuits brought 
for a complex mix of noneconomic and economic reasons). 
89.  See, e.g., Rothman, supra note 42, at 206 (pointing out false dichotomy between emotional 
and economic rights). 
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stressed that it was Robin Thicke and Pharrell Williams who filed suit 
when they “had the temerity to question why their father was not credited” 
in “Blurred Lines.” 90  
In the “Stairway to Heaven” litigation, the trustee for the Randy Craig 
Wolfe trust sued members of the band Led Zeppelin for copying 
significant portions of the song “Taurus,” written by the deceased 
musician Randy Wolfe, a.k.a. “Randy California.” Led Zeppelin had 
toured with Wolfe’s band, Spirit, in the late 1960s, during which Spirit had 
performed “Taurus” many times. The complaint alleged “[f]alsification of 
Rock n’ Roll [h]istory”91  and that “Randy California deserves writing 
credit for ‘Stairway to Heaven’ and to take his place as an author of 
Rock’s greatest song.”92 In opposition to defendant’s summary judgment 
motion, the plaintiff submitted affidavits by Wolfe’s sister, friends, and 
bandmates indicating that Wolfe had long been frustrated for not receiving 
attribution for his contribution to “Stairway to Heaven,” had long been 
pressured to sue, but had repeatedly desisted out of financial concerns.93 
                                                
90.  See Counter-Claimants’ Joint Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 1, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-06004-JAK-AGR, 2016 
WL 6822309 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2016); see also Defendant’s Opening Statement at 81, Williams, No. 
2:13-CV-06004-JAK-AGR, 2016 WL 6822309 (“Jan Gaye did not want to be here. Nona didn't want 
to be here. Frankie Gaye didn't want to be here. And Marvin the III didn't want to be here. And how 
did we know that? Because when she heard Blurred Lines, she loved it. And she knew that it was so 
similar that it just had to have been licensed. She even tweeted out thanks to Robin Thicke and Pharrell 
Williams because she believed it had to have been licensed. Unfortunately, as she later learned and as 
the family later learned, they had not licensed Got to Give it Up, had not credited Marvin Gaye, but 
made tens of millions of dollars on it.”). 
91.  Plaintiff’s Complaint, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No 2:14-CV-03089-JS, at 26 (E.D. Pa. 
May 31, 2014), transferred No. 2:15-CV-03462-RGK-AGR, 2016 WL 6674985 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 
2016). 
92.  Id. at 4. 
93.  See Declaration of David Waterbury ¶¶ 5–6, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. 2:15-CV-
03462-RGK-AGR, 2016 WL 6674985 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016) (“Jimmy Page told Randy when 
confronted that Randy could go ahead and try to sue him, but that Led Zeppelin would hire 20 to 25 
lawyers for every lawyer Spirit could hire, that they would lose, and that they didn't stand a chance. 
Randy was extremely and visibly despondent and frustrated about this incident. Randy said that after 
he and Page talked a little more they simply shook hands and parted. Randy said ‘and that was it.’”); 
Declaration of Janet Wolfe ¶ 10, Skidmore, No. 2:15-CV-03462-RGK-AGR, 2016 WL 6674985 (“The 
brother I knew was a kind, gentle soul for whom the music—not the money—was everything. Randy 
told me he knew that Jimmy Page had lifted his song from Taurus, and he felt beleaguered by 
interviewers always asking him about it and people always telling him he was crazy for not suing.”); 
Decl. of Tracy Longo ¶ 26, Skidmore, No. 2:15-CV-03462-RGK-AGR, 2016 WL 6674985 (“I told 
Randy, ‘You should go after Led Zeppelin. It would be the biggest lawsuit. It would be like someone 
goin’ after Freebird. Win or lose the band Spirit’s gonna get notoriety that it deserves.’ Randy thought 
about it and responded, ‘Well, I wouldn’t lose, my publisher has 50 percent of all my stuff. Any 
money I would get out of this would—I would never see any money. I don’t know even if it would be 
worth it or if I could get a lawyer to take this on.’”). 
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“Randy Craig Wolfe did not have a lot of money during his life and was 
touring on a shoe string budget. He could not have hired a lawyer.”94  
Other recent lawsuits against the creators of the musical Jersey Boys 
and the sitcom The Big Bang Theory similarly alleged that the defendants 
had received significant revenue and acclaim from a deceased author’s 
uncredited work. In the Jersey Boys litigation, the decedent, Rex 
Woodward, coauthored but never published a manuscript about the pop 
group the Four Seasons. Woodward died of lung cancer 1991, and the 
other coauthor, Four Season’s member Tommy Devito, used the 
manuscript as the basis for the hit musical Jersey Boys. Woodward’s 
family received nothing, and Woodward was given no credit for his 
contribution. According to the complaint filed by his widow, “Mr. 
Woodard’s dying wish was that Plaintiff and his sister would ensure that 
the Work was published after his death. Mr. Woodard also hoped that 
income generated by the Work, and/or adaptations thereof, would support 
his wife and children when he would no longer be there to support 
them.”95 Woodward’s widow and sister documented a decade’s worth of 
unsuccessful efforts to obtain a publisher, which ultimately was foreclosed 
by the launch of Jersey Boys, and Woodward’s erasure from the project. A 
jury found DeVito liable for copyright infringement, although the 
presiding judge subsequently found defendants’ use protected by the fair 
use doctrine. 96  In a lawsuit filed in 2016, the producers of Big Bang 
Theory were sued for their extensive commercial use of the short poem, 
“Soft Kitty,” written and published by the plaintiffs’ deceased mother, 
while she worked as a nursery school teacher.97 “Not only did Defendants 
fail to credit Edith Newlin, but they also went so far as to put a credit on 
some merchandise and accompanying packaging and tags, making it 
                                                
94.  Declaration of David Waterbury ¶ 11. 
95.  Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint ¶ 36, Corbello v. Devito, 832 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (D. 
Nev. 2011) (No. 2:08-CV-00867-RCJ-PAL). 
96.  Ashley Cullins, Jury Finds ‘Jersey Boys’ Creators Liable for Copyright Infringement, 
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Nov. 29, 2016 11:33 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/jury-finds-
jersey-boys-creators-liable-copyright-infringment-951024; Eriq Gardner, Judge Overturns Jury’s 
Verdict That “Jersey Boys” Is a Copyright Infringment, HOLLYWOOD REP. (June 14, 2017), 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/judge-overturns-jurys-verdict-jersey-boys-is-a-copyright-
infringement-1013558. 
97.  Complaint, Chase v. Warner Bros., No. 1:15-CV-10063-NRB, 2017 WL 2172909 
 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2017). According to the complaint, “Defendants . . . used the Soft Kitty Lyrics 
in their entirety and with only a minor change in word order: 
Soft kitty, warm kitty [instead of “Warm kitty, soft kitty”], 
Little ball of fur, 
Happy kitty, sleepy kitty [instead of “Sleepy kitty, happy kitty”], 
Purr! Purr! Purr!” 
Id. at ¶ 48. 
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appear as if one of the Defendants themselves created the Soft Kitty 
Lyrics.”98 
This narrative of insufficient credit loomed particularly large in efforts 
by the heirs of Jack Kirby and Jerome Siegel to reclaim copyright in some 
of the most acclaimed (and lucrative) comic book superheroes: 
Many of our most celebrated literary and musical works were 
created before 1978 and signed away to publishers in un-
remunerative transactions . . . . It would be hard to find a better 
example of this than the prolific Jack Kirby who worked in his 
basement with no contract, no financial security, and no 
employment benefits, but without whom Marvel might not even be 
in business today.99 
Under the “termination of transfers” provisions of the 1976 Copyright Act, 
an author’s heirs are entitled to terminate assignments and licenses to third 
parties “notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary.” 100  This is a 
powerful tool for family members to renegotiate compensation schemes 
that were arranged long before the true commercial value of a creative 
work was realized,101 and unsurprisingly these termination provisions can 
substantially increase the economic value of postmortem copyright. 
Nonetheless, efforts to use the termination provisions are infused with 
desires for both money and recognition.  
For the children of Jack Kirby, who first penned superheroes such as 
The Fantastic Four, Iron Man, Thor, and X-Men, their litigation with 
Marvel Comics was a continuation of their “father’s quest for credit and 
fair compensation.”102 In Neal Kirby’s deposition, he recalled his father’s 
complaints about not getting paid for the pages he submitted to Marvel’s 
Stan Lee and frustration when Lee had not given him public credit for 
creating major characters, such as Thor.103 Jack Kirby labored exhausting 
hours on his comic book characters in a smoke-filled basement 
“Dungeon,” and his son fondly recalled “treasur[ing] the fact I had a front-
                                                
98.  Id. ¶ 53.  
99.  Reply Brief for Petitioners at 13, Kirby v. Marvel Characters, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 42 (Mem) 
(2014).  
100.  17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c)(5) (2012). 
101.  Termination rights were “needed because of the unequal bargaining position of authors.” 
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976). 
102.  See Jeffrey Texler, Should the Kirby Family Have Settled?, COMICS J. (Nov. 21, 2014), 
http://www.tcj.com/should-the-kirby-family-have-settled/. 
103.  Supplemental Declaration of Marc Toberoff in Support of Defendants’ Opposition to 
Summary Judgment at 84, Marvel Worldwide v. Kirby, No. 1:10-CV-00141-CM-KNF (S.D.N.Y. filed 
Mar. 28, 2011) (“I do recall one instance involving the creation of Thor and I guess Stan had taken—
he had created that and my father was very upset about that. He said Thor was his idea, his creation.”). 
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row seat for that cosmic event.” 104  The Kirbys wove together family 
nostalgia and romantic authorship to hammer home the unfairness for not 
giving proper credit and ongoing royalties to Kirby and his family for 
creating some of the most enduring and profitable entertainment 
franchises. The heirs of Jerome Siegel, co-creator of Superman, similarly 
emphasized the author’s unfair treatment at the hands of DC Comics.105  
B. Remedying Exploitation 
Closely related to heirs’ concerns that the decedent was insufficiently 
credited for their work is the frequently strong sentiment that the decedent 
was mistreated or exploited during life and that this mistreatment is 
continuing after death. Accordingly, the role of the IP heir is to protect 
their loved one against individuals who seek to exploit their labor and 
memory with little care for the actual human being who has passed.  
Gerard Basquiat was the father and sole intestate heir of the acclaimed 
artist Jean-Michel Basquiat, who died of a drug overdose in 1988 at the 
age of twenty-seven. Gerard was highly protective of his son’s legacy and 
spent much of the rest of his life heavily involved in overseeing Jean-
Michel’s estate. “He tightly controlled his son’s copyrights, methodically 
poring over movie scripts, biographies or gallery show publications that 
wanted to use his son’s works or images.”106 For example, he refused 
permission for Julian Schnabel to use images of Jean-Michel’s work in his 
1996 film, Basquiat, about the two artists’ friendship.107 Gerard largely 
blamed the 1980s art world for contributing to his son’s destructive 
lifestyle while attempting to profit greatly off of his work, both before and 
                                                
104.  Neal Kirby, Growing up Kirby: The Marvel Memories of Jack Kirby’s Son, HERO 
COMPLEX (Apr. 9, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://herocomplex.latimes.com/comics/growing-up-kirby-the-
marvel-memories-of-jack-kirbys-son/#/0; see also Defendants’ Pre-Trial Statement at 2, Marvel 
Worldwide v. Kirby, No. 1:10-CV-00141-CM-KNF (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 1, 2011) (“Kirby worked as a 
freelancer from the basement of his own home, without any financial security.”); Reply Memorandum 
in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Marvel Worldwide v. Kirby, No. 1:10-
CV-00141-CM-KNF (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 8, 2011) (“Marvel did not own Kirby's prolific creations as 
‘work for hire’ the moment his pencil hit paper in the basement studio he fondly called ‘The 
Dungeon.’”). 
105.  Open Letter from Laura Siegel Larson, Daughter of Superman Co-Creator Jerry Siegel 
(Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.filmbuffonline.com/FBOLNewsreel/wordpress/2012/10/17/th e-laura-
siegel-larson-letter-only-part-of-the-story/. 
106.  James Fanelli, Jean-Michel Basquiat's Dad Leaves Behind Son's Art, and Tax Problem, 
DNAINFO (Sept. 5, 2013, 6:27 AM), https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20130905/boerum-hill/jean-
michel-basquiats-dad-leaves-behind-sons-art-tax-problem. 
107.  Katie Calautti, Why This Movie Perfectly Re-Created a Picasso, Destroyed It, and Mailed 
the Evidence to Picasso’s Estate, VANITY FAIR (Apr. 25, 2014, 1:06 PM), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2014/04/art-in-movies.  
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after his death. 108  In an interview about administering Jean-Michel’s 
estate, Gerard lamented, “People took advantage of Jean Michel[—he] 
was very young and had a loose life style, and the minute he died all these 
people came up with groundless claims.” 109  By contrast, when 
documentarian Tamra Davis sought permission to use archived footage in 
a 2010 documentary, Gerard told her “I trust you. You’re the only person 
who has had something of this of my son for this long time and you’ve 
never profited from it? I’ve never heard of you?”110 By the time he died in 
2013, however, Gerard Basquiat had been widely criticized for tightly 
controlling his son’s legacy.111  
Similar criticism has been lodged at Robyn Astaire, the third wife and 
widow of legendary dancer/actor Fred Astaire.112 She has refused use of 
classic movie clips for numerous entertainment projects, for several 
documentaries and, controversially, a Kennedy Center tribute to Astaire’s 
frequent costar, Ginger Rogers.113 She also has sued commercial entities 
for using Fred’s likeness without permission.114 A journalist with the Los 
Angeles Times aptly framed the debate surrounding Robyn Astaire: “Is 
Robyn Astaire the greedy ogre her critics contend, condemning her 
husband's image to obscurity in her misguided craving for money? Or is 
she the protective widow, pining after the only person who really loved 
her and tending the fires of his lifelong perfectionism?”115 
In the few public interviews she has given, Robyn Astaire related that 
Fred had told her, “I’ve been taken advantage of all my life. Please don’t 
let them take advantage of me. And I know you won’t. I’m leaving you in 
                                                
108.  Liza Ghorbani, The Devil on the Door, N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 28, 2011), http://nymag.com/ 
arts/art/features/jean-michel-basquiat-2011-9/. 
109.  Grace Glueck, The Basquiat Touch Survives the Artist in Shows and Courts, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 22, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/22/arts/the-basquiat-touch-survives-the-artist-in-
shows-and-courts.html. For a fuller discussion of Jean-Michel Basquiat’s life and death, particularly in 
the shadow of the booming 1980s art market, see PHOEBE HOBAN, BASQUIAT: A QUICK KILLING IN 
ART (1998). 
110.  Interview by Dreux Dougall with Tamra Davis, filmmaker (Dec. 22, 2010), 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/the-daily-need/a-portrait-of-the-artist-as-a-young-man/5984/ 
111.  See Fanelli, supra note 106.  
112.  See, e.g., Irene Lacher, Fred Is Her Co-Pilot, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 17, 1997), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1997/aug/17/entertainment/ca-23118 (“Daggers have been drawn over the 
way Robyn Astaire has meagerly—and expensively—parceled out approval for the use of clips of his 
classic films.”). 
113.  Id. 
114.  See Astaire v. Best Film & Video Corp., 116 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1997). She was 
particularly criticized, however, when she did allow the use of Astaire clips in a series of Dirt Devil 
advertisements. According to an interviewer, “she gave the nod to Dirt Devil because the company 
granted her artistic control and because Fred himself was no stranger to commercials—during his life, 
he appeared in ads for Chesterfield cigarettes and the now-defunct Western Airlines, among others.” 
Lacher, supra note 112. 
115.  Lacher, supra note 112. 
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charge because I trust you implicitly.”116 Accordingly, when people use 
Fred’s image without permission, “I have to go after them. I’m constantly 
scolding people because they think they own him.” 117  Fred’s son has 
concurred: “I think my father knew how people exploited personalities 
[after their death], and he didn’t want that to happen to him. Protecting 
him is Robyn’s job.”118 This job is demonstrably inseparable from her 
grief and emotional connection to Astaire. Although the two were over 
forty-five years apart in age, Robyn fondly remembers, “Every night after 
dinner . . . we’d tango out of the dining room . . . . He was so much fun. 
For the first time in my life, I had someone who truly loved me. I was so 
lucky.”119 After Fred’s death, Robyn “found herself bereft of purpose save 
for preserving—and protecting—the Astaire legend.”120 Other celebrities’ 
surviving family members view themselves in a similar position.121 
In addition to protecting decedents from continued financial 
mistreatment, IP estates have exercised postmortem rights against the 
backdrop of discrimination and cultural appropriation. For example, heirs 
to blues singer Bessie Smith brought copyright and right of publicity 
claims against Columbia Records, charging that its licensing arrangements 
with Smith reflected systemic racial discrimination and took advantage of 
Smith’s illiteracy and ignorance of financial matters. 122  The court, 
however, ultimately was unwilling to toll the statute of limitations for 
almost forty years, but the descendible nature of both copyright and right 
of publicity has on several occasions provided the opportunity for an heir 
to combat discrimination suffered by the decedent.123  
                                                
116.  Mark Goodman, Keeping the Flame, PEOPLE (Feb. 22, 1993, 12:00 PM), 
http://people.com/archive/keeping-the-flame-vol-39-no-7/. 
117.  Id.; see also Bob Thomas, Fred Astaire's widow says she is guarding his legacy, 
AMARILLO GLOBE-NEWS (June 2, 1998, 12:26 PM), http://amarillo.com/stories/060298/ent_s 
he.shtml#.WEdLZZMrKCQ.  
118.  Lacher, supra note 112. 
119.  Goodman, supra note 116. 
120.  Id. 
121.  See, e.g., Tony Cantu, Cashing in on Selena, HISP., June 1996, at 18, 22 (“Quintanilla 
[father of the late singer Selena] explains that though he may not show it, he grieves daily for his 
daughter, and staving off attempts to capitalize on his daughter's death has preoccupied his time.”). 
122.  Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600, 632, 637 (E.D. Pa. 1979); see also K.J. Greene, 
“Copynorms,” Black Cultural Production, and the Debate over African-American Reparations, 25 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1179, 1204–07 (2008) (discussing judicial indifference to exploitation of 
black artists in the Gee case). 
123.  See, e.g., Complaint, Black Box Royalties, Inc. v. Rhino Entm’t Co., No. 1:15-CV-04012-
LLM (N.D. Ga. filed Nov. 17, 2015) (lawsuit by same-sex partner of deceased collaborator of Otis 
Redding, seeking unpaid royalties from record company); Sean O’Connor et al., Opinion, Overdue 
Legal Recognition for African-American Artists in ‘Blurred Lines’ Copyright Case, SEATTLE TIMES 
(May 20, 2015, 5:19 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/overdue-legal-recognition-for-african-
american-artists-in-blurred-lines-copyright-case/. 
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In 2007, Connie Brooks brought a right of publicity claim against 
Topps for releasing a baseball card using the image of her father, James 
“Cool Papa” Bell.124 Bell played, managed, coached, and scouted for the 
Negro Leagues from 1922 to 1950, and he was inducted into the Baseball 
Hall of Fame in 1974.125 According to Brooks, “I promised my father that 
I would carry on and keep his legacy alive” and she has worked “tirelessly 
. . . to make sure that he is not forgotten . . . .”126 In the Topps litigation, 
Brooks emphasized, “My father endured tremendous injustices during his 
career and in life. My father refused to let racism or segregation 
discourage him.” 127  Nonetheless, Cool Papa Bell subsequently worked 
twenty-two years as a custodian, never received a pension from the Negro 
League or Major League Baseball, and it took his daughter five years to 
save enough money to purchase a proper headstone for his grave.128 With 
this backdrop, Brooks argued: 
“[T]he right of publicity protects a person from losing the benefit of 
his work . . . this is especially true where, as here, the celebrity is an 
African-American man who lived in an era in which entertainment 
essentially provided the only opportunity for a man like him to 
achieve success, and even the highest attainable levels of success 
did not equal prosperity during life.”129  
Although the Topps court rejected the publicity rights claim on statute of 
limitations grounds,130 Topps subsequently publicly apologized to Brooks 
and settled on undisclosed terms.131 Inherited IP rights were a vehicle for 
Brooks to push back against the continued commercial exploitation of her 
                                                
124.  Brooks ex rel. Estate of Bell v. Topps Co., No. 06-CV-2359 (DLC), 2007 WL 4547585 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2007) 
125.  Id. at *1. 
126.  Declaration of Connie Brooks in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment ¶ 9, Brooks, No. 06-CV-2359(DLC), 2007 WL 4547585. 
127.  Id. ¶ 6. 
128.  Id. ¶¶ 7–8. Additionally, before he died, hundreds of thousands of dollars in merchandise 
was stolen from his home by memorabilia dealers, who were subsequently indicted with theft and 
fraud. William C. Rhoden, Cool Papa Bell’s Stolen Moments, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 1990), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/07/sports/sports-of-the-times-cool-papa-s-stolen-moments.html. 
129.  Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 14, Brooks, No. 06-CV-2359(DLC), 2007 WL 4547585. 
130.  See Brooks, No. 06-CV-2359(DLC), 2007 WL 4547585, at *5; see also Lateef Mtima, 
What’s Mine is Mine but What’s Yours Is Ours: IP Imperialism, the Right of Publicity, and Intellectual 
Property Social Justice in the Digital Information Age, 15 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 323, 356–60 
(2012) (arguing that the Brooks court was insufficiently sensitive to the social justice issues raised in 
the case). 
131.  Press Release, Topps Co., Topps Settles Lawsuit Over Cool Papa Bell Cards, 
PRNEWSWIRE (Nov. 14, 2008), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/topps-settles-lawsuit-over-
cool-papa-bell-cards-65433552.html.  
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father after his death and, in at least a small way, bring a sense of honor to 
someone who had encountered a lifetime of injustice.132 As mentioned in 
the Introduction, the Supreme Court’s 2014 opinion in Petrella broadens 
opportunities for heirs (at the very least in the copyright context) to 
challenge unfair treatment of their family members long after tort remedies 
have expired.  
IP estates are frequently criticized for stingily refusing permission for 
uses of the deceased artist’s work that would seem to enrich the public 
domain and harm no one. Professor Spoo, for example, has argued that 
long copyright terms, stewarded by overly protective estates, upset the 
“ecological cycle” in which old works “become part of the furniture of our 
cultural life.”133 Our most valuable cultural works have their origins in the 
“raw material of the public domain,” and eventually those works “return[] 
to the public domain to enrich those raw materials and to spur the creation 
of new works.”134 He envisions a time when “Joyce's oeuvre will finally 
take its place with The Odyssey and The Aeneid as raw myth-making 
material for some future national epic. Indeed, it could be argued that 
works do not really become ‘classics’ until they are unqualifiedly available 
for cultural exploitation.”135 
The perspective of the heirs here, however, is a forceful reminder that 
the debates around intellectual property versus the public domain cannot 
be so easily reduced to greed versus righteousness, irrationality versus 
enlightenment, or stuck-in-the-past versus embracing the future. A vibrant 
public domain may appear to be an unmitigated good—more speech, more 
knowledge, more progress.136 But it comes at a cost, and too often that cost 
is the unacknowledged and uncompensated labor of women, minorities, 
indigenous peoples, and outsider artists. 137  Surviving family members 
sometimes bristle at the notion that an artist will “blend into the cultural 
scenery” and be treated as a stock, generic element for future commercial 
                                                
132.  Along these lines, Professor K.J. Greene has argued that “creative intellectual property 
also belongs in the debate on reparations.” Greene, supra note 122, at 1217; see also MADHAVI 
SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE (2012); Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the 
Developmental Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821 (2006). 
133.  Spoo, supra note 59, at 108. 
134.  Id. at 107–08.  
135.  Id. at 110–11. 
136.  See SUNDER, supra note 132; See Chon, supra note 132.  
137.  See Andrew Gilden, Raw Materials and the Creative Process, 104 GEO. L.J. 355 (2016). 
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endeavors. 138  IP is one means of pushing back against erasure and 
involuntary cultural appropriation.139 
When artists die, their lives’ work cannot be so easily disentangled 
from the questionable conditions in which they were produced. And it is 
particularly galling to expect artists’ families to overlook this historical 
context and get out of the way of cultural progress. Creative works are 
never truly “raw”—unworked and awaiting cultural meaning; they are 
instead cultural legacies that are produced in very particular social 
contexts amidst webs of human relationships. 140  Intellectual property 
rights can serve as tools for preventing those in power from tearing down 
those webs and glossing over troubling contexts in which they too often 
were built.  
C. Family Privacy 
 Of all the noneconomic motivations for asserting copyright 
infringement, privacy is perhaps the most debated by intellectual property 
scholars, with a robust contemporary debate on both sides of the issue.141 
Copyright law generally gives stronger protections for unpublished works 
and allows authors and their heirs significant leeway in deciding what 
works to publish, and when. Accordingly, copyright has been an attractive 
vehicle for notoriously reclusive authors like J.D. Salinger. The right of 
publicity has direct genealogical roots in Warren and Brandeis’ famed 
right of privacy, and it is fairly uncontroversial for an individual to use 
publicity rights to limit exposure of embarrassing or intimate portrayals.142  
What is more controversial in both the copyright and right of publicity 
realms, however, is the interest of an heir in protecting their family’s 
privacy. Privacy rights, unlike property rights, are typically understood to 
be personal to the individual and to extinguish upon death.143 Accordingly, 
the use of an inherited property right to achieve privacy-related ends 
would seem at least arguably improper. Nonetheless, privacy concerns 
repeatedly emerge in disputes initiated by IP estates.  
                                                
138.  See John J. Pauly, Taming the Wildest: What We’ve Made of Louis Prima, in AFTERLIFE 
AS AFTERIMAGE: UNDERSTANDING POSTHUMOUS FAME 191 (Steve Jones & Joli Jensen eds., 2005). 
139.  Id. at 201 (documenting lawsuits by Gia Prima, widow of swing musician Louis Prima, 
against Campbell Soup and Olive Garden). 
140.  See Gilden, supra note 137. 
141.  Compare Fromer, supra note 18, with M. Margaret McKeown, Censorship in the Guise of 
Authorship: Harmonizing Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1 
(2016). 
142.  Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (1890). 
143.  Rothman, supra note 42, at 203. 
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Although the decedent in many IP disputes was a celebrity or public 
figure, quite often the successor rights holder is not. Accordingly, the term 
“reclusive” pops up repeatedly in regards to IP estates that are widely seen 
as stingy with permissions or overprotective of their family members’ 
legacies. Stephen Joyce, Robyn Astaire, Gerard Basquiat, Christopher 
Tolkien, and Teresa Earnhardt, for example, have all at times been called 
reclusive or secretive. 144  On one hand, this reclusiveness may seem 
troubling; they are the gatekeepers to extremely public cultural legacies; 
on the other hand, they did not themselves seek a career as a celebrity and 
may wish to maintain a quiet existence now that their loved one has 
passed. For example, in litigation between the Joyce estate and English 
professor Carol Shloss, the unpublished letters145 at issue concerned the 
mental health of James Joyce’s daughter, Lucia, and how it impacted her 
relationship with her family.146 Lucia was certainly not a public figure by 
choice, and the disclosure of letters containing such information likely 
would be objectionable to many private individuals. It may be difficult to 
sympathize with these interests, particularly when exercised by a hostile or 
aggressive heir, but the underlying interest itself should not be dismissed 
out-of-hand. Again, IP theory and First Amendment doctrine may 
justifiably limit estates’ ability to silence documentarians, biographers, 
and journalists, but the public attention that comes from the death of a 
celebrity can have significant privacy implications for the people in the 
celebrity’s orbit.  
For example, Nancy Benoit was married to, and tragically murdered by, 
professional wrestler Chris Benoit, and this murder received widespread 
media coverage. Hustler Magazine used this public interest in Chris and 
Nancy to justify publishing nude photographs of Nancy that she had taken 
more than twenty years earlier. Nancy’s mother successfully sued for 
violation of Nancy’s publicity rights, which are descendible in Georgia.147 
                                                
144.  See, e.g., Spoo, supra note 13 (Joyce); Goodman, supra note 116 (Astaire); Carl E. Butler, 
Teresa Earnhardt: Her Side of the Story, Race Journal Online (May 28, 2007), 
http://racejournalonline.com/index.php?page=read&article=126 
145.  On the recurring issue of copyright and unpublished letters see Alan Lee Zegas, Personal 
Letters: A Dilemma for Copyright and Privacy Law, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 134 (1980). 
146.  See A Fire in the Brain, NEW YORKER (Dec. 8, 2003), https://www.newyorker.com/maga 
zine/2003/12/08/a-fire-in-the-brain (“In fact, many artists’ children turn out just fine, and grow up to 
edit their parents’ work and live off the royalties. But some do not—for example, James Joyce’s two 
children. His son became an alcoholic; his daughter went mad. Carol Loeb Shloss, a Joyce scholar who 
teaches at Stanford, has just written a book about the latter.”); see also Richard Lea, Ted Hughes 
Estate Withdraws Biographer’s Access, GUARDIAN (Mar. 31, 2014, 8:20 AM), https://www.theguardi 
an.com/books/2014/mar/31/ted-hughes-estate-biographer-jonathan-bate-access (Ted Hughes 
biographer Jonathan Bate “suggests that the [Hughes’] family may be worried by the prospect of 
revelations about the poet's private life.”). 
147.  Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Grp., LLC, 483 Fed. App’x 561 (11th Cir. 2012). 
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At trial, Maureen testified that she viewed it as her responsibility “to 
protect her [daughter]” and that she would have never given permission 
for her daughter to be shown in a “hardcore pornography” magazine.148 
An analogous scenario confronted Teresa Earnhardt, widow of 
legendary NASCAR driver Dale Earnhardt, Sr., who died tragically in an 
accident at the 2001 Daytona 500. There was understandably tremendous 
media interest in the accident and Earnhardt’s death, and certain media 
outlets requested that the Volusia County, Florida coroner release autopsy 
photos of Earnhardt’s corpse to help assist their coverage. Teresa 
successfully sued for violation of her husband’s publicity rights. In her 
motion for a permanent injunction, she wove together themes of privacy 
and commercial exploitation: 
[T]he relationship between Teresa Earnhardt as wife as well as Dale 
Earnhardt, Jr. and Taylor Earnhardt as children and Dale Earnhardt 
could not possibly be any more intimate and sacred. It is beyond 
doubt that each of these family members have a right of privacy in 
their own right to prevent the needless emotional distress which 
would accompany the release of the autopsy images.149 
Against this backdrop, use of these photos by the Orlando Sentinel were 
solely meant “to profit from Dale Earnhardt’s family tragedy.” 150  She 
further emphasized the importance of a privacy interest in the wake of her 
husband’s death: 
The Earnhardt family is still grieving from the loss of Mr. Earnhardt 
just a few short weeks ago. . . . The Earnhardt family is entitled to 
their privacy in grieving for the loss of Dale Earnhardt as a father 
and husband. To inflict additional grief and emotional distress on 
this family is simply unjustified.151 
The trial court ultimately agreed that “[t]he publication of a person’s 
autopsy photographs constitutes a unique, serious, and extraordinarily 
intrusive invasion of the personal privacy of that person's surviving family 
members, particularly their children, parents, and spouse.”152 
Although the Earnhardt and Benoit cases are fairly extreme instances of 
a decedent’s image being used in morally suspect ways, they nonetheless 
                                                
148.  See Transcript of Jury Trial Proceedings at 151, 154, Toffoloni, 483 Fed. Appx. 561 (No. 
1:08-CV-00421-TWT).  
149.  Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motions for Permanent Injunction, at 8, 
Earnhardt v. Volusia County, No. 2001-30373-CICI, 2001 WL 992068 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 10, 2001). 
150.  Id. at 17. 
151.  Id. at 20. 
152.  Earnhardt, No. 2001-30373-CICI, 2001 WL 992068, at *3. 
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are an important reminder of the interests that postmortem IP rights can 
serve, particularly in the absence of a general postmortem right to privacy. 
IP rights are a way for family members to protect themselves from the 
emotional harms that flow strongly, if technically indirectly, from 
presentation of a decedent’s image or likeness in unexpected or highly 
objectionable contexts. This type of emotional distress will often need to 
give way to factual reporting on matters of public interest or subsequent 
authors’ critical commentary about the decedent,153 but family privacy is 
nonetheless an important, unavoidable variable in the balance between IP 
and free speech.  
D. Moral or Reputational Integrity 
Another interest frequently cited by IP estates—and probably the most 
difficult to square with the First Amendment—is the need to purify the 
memory of a loved one in the face of unflattering or misleading portrayals. 
IP owners often seek to suppress such unflattering uses of an image or 
likeness, for example reinterpretations of Gone With the Wind or Porgy 
and Bess, photographs of Barbie in a blender,154 or blog posts critical of a 
public figure.155 In such circumstances, fair use and related free speech 
defenses rightfully prevent rights holders from dominating cultural 
discourse or demand that critics obtain licenses from the objects of their 
critiques.156 Nonetheless, even if the effect of such “integrity” interests are 
ultimately unacceptable, 157  the underlying desire for integrity is not 
necessarily abhorrent, particularly as expressed in the context of 
postmortem rights.158 
                                                
153.  See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (“Exposure of the self to others in 
varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an 
essential incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of 
press.”); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (overturning civil liability for newspaper that 
truthfully published the name of a rape victim, contrary to state law). 
154.  Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003). 
155.  Katz v. Google, Inc., 802 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2015). 
156.  See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
157.  The United States only recognizes a very limited right of “integrity” for works of fine art, 
and this right is personal to the author, i.e. it can’t be devised or alienated. See 17 U.S.C. § 
106A(a)(3)(a) (providing a limited right “to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other 
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation”). Professor 
Amy Adler has been one of the most vocal opponents of this ability of authors to limit critical 
disintegrations of their work. See Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263 (2009). 
158.  These tensions between an estate’s desire to uphold the integrity of the author’s work and 
the strong public interest in reshaping that work were evident in a recent dispute between the estate of 
Edward Albee and an Oregon production of Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? The estate has been 
heavily criticized for insisting that the character Nick be played solely by white actors, in line with 
Albee’s expressed casting wishes. See, e.g., Kyle Turner, Who’s Afraid of White Fragility? Edward 
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For example, Christopher Tolkien, the son and executor of author 
J.R.R. Tolkien, has been criticized for his hostile stance towards 
commercial uses of The Hobbit and The Lord of the Rings lore—
particularly the blockbuster films directed by Peter Jackson.159 The elder 
Tolkien assigned movie rights for his books in order to cover his 
children’s potential estate tax bills.160 Christopher Tolkien has expressed 
“intellectual despair” over the results, highlighting the “parallel universe” 
between his father’s writings and their commercial descendants; his 
ultimate fear is that the films would (like The Ring of Power and Sméagol) 
“engulf the literary works” on which they were based.161  In his view, 
Jackson “eviscerated the book by making it an action movie for young 
people aged 15 to 25”; the resulting “commercialization has reduced the 
aesthetic and philosophical impact of the creation to nothing.” 162 
Accordingly, he has invoked intellectual property rights to “protect the 
literary work from the three-ring circus that has developed around it.”163 
The Tolkien estate sued Warner Brothers for what it viewed as 
overextensions of its acquired rights: The Lord of the Rings slot machines 
and downloadable “[h]ack-and-slash” videogames.164 These are examples, 
                                                                                                           
Albee, HYPERALLERGIC (May 25, 2007), https://hyperallergic.com/381406/whos-afraid-of-white-
fragility-edward-albee/; Diep Tran, When a Writer’s Rights Aren’t Right: The ‘Virginia Woolf’ Casting 
Fight, AM. THEATRE (May 22, 2017) http://www.americantheatre.org/2017/05/22/when-a-writers-
rights-arent-right-the-virginia-woolf-casting-fight/. The casting director, however, was more 
circumspect: “I do not question the motives of those that made the decision. . . . I think they have some 
fealty to a sense of integrity to Edward Albee’s desires. But I had hoped the negative aspects of Albee 
would die with him. I do not question their right to make the decision. If I did, I would pursue it 
legally.” Hazel Cills, Did the Edward Albee Foundation Deny Rights to a Play Because the Production 
Cast a Black Actor?, JEZEBEL (May 18, 2017, 4:40 PM), http://jezebel.com/did-the-edward-albee-
foundation-deny-rights-to-a-play-b-1795345657. 
159.  See, e.g., Michael Masnick, Tolkien Estate Strikes Again: Forces Summer Camp To 
Change Name, TECHDIRT (Apr. 20, 2011, 11:40 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/201 
10419/01104713954/tolkien-estate-strikes-again-forces-summer-camp-to-change-name.shtml; Michael 
Masnick, Tolkien Estate Says Just Mentioning Tolkien Infringes; Tolkien Censorwear Appears In 
Response, TECHDIRT (Feb. 28, 2011, 8:43 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110226/1 
9564813296/tolkien-estate-says-just-mentioning-tolkien-infringes-tolkien-censorwear-appears-
response.shtml.  
160.  Raphaëlle Rérolle, Tolkien, L’anneau de la Discorde, LE MONDE (Fr.) (July 5, 2012 3:15 
PM), http://www.lemonde.fr/culture/article/2012/07/05/tolkien-l-anneau-de-la-discorde_1729858_324 
6.html (for a translation by Jeff Israely see My Father’s “Eviscerated” Work—Son of Hobbit Scribe 
J.R.R. Tolkien Finally Speaks Out, WORLDCRUNCH (Dec. 5, 2012), https://www.world 
crunch.com/world-affairs/my-father039s-quotevisceratedquot-work-son-of-hobbit-scribe-jrr-tolkien-
finally-speaks-out). 
161.  Id. 
162.  Id. 
163.  Id. 
164.  Erik Wecks, The Tolkien Estate Sues to Protect Their Precious, WIRED (Nov. 21, 2012), 
https://www.wired.com/2012/11/tolkien-lawsuit/. 
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according to the estate’s complaint, of commercial entities “prostituting 
art.”165 
The question ultimately is why millions of Tolkien fans should be 
subject to the aesthetic judgments of the author’s son, and the likely 
answer is that they should not. But when viewed from the perspective of 
Christopher Tolkien, the desire to preserve the integrity of the original 
Tolkien literary works is deeply personal and important. He had a front 
row seat to his father’s authorship of these classic works and assisted with 
typing and drawing the manuscripts. When Christopher served in the Air 
Force, his father would send him weekly updates on The Lord of the 
Rings. When his father died, Christopher gave up his Oxford professorship 
to work on his father’s unpublished works, and he now feels a “heavy 
responsibility” to keep his father’s original vision alive.166 Frodo, Sam, 
Gandalf, and fellow riders are not open-ended cultural memes for 
Tolkien’s family; they are the products of the long, hard work of their 
father and are rooted in very specific childhood experiences. Again, family 
nostalgia certainly should not be the sole driver of cultural policy, but its 
already substantial role cannot be ignored. 
 Christopher Tolkien is hardly alone among heirs in turning to IP to 
protect the integrity of a family member’s public memories. Connie 
Brooks, daughter of Cool Papa Bell, brought her lawsuit against Topps in 
large part because Topps portrayed her father as “a lazy buffoon, or a 
drunkard, who did not take the game seriously.” 167  The baseball card 
falsely stated that Bell “earned his nickname, by falling asleep before a 
game.” 168  Teresa Earnhardt emphasized during her lawsuit against the 
Florida coroner that her “family's desire and right to control the property 
interests in Dale Earnhardt's name and likeness is driven by their desire to 
protect the sanctity of Dale Earnhardt's memory . . . [as] a man full of life 
and energy who earned the respect of the world . . . .”169 Published autopsy 
                                                
165.  Complaint ¶ 8, Fourth Age Ltd. v. Warner Bros, No. 12-CV-9912 (C.D. Cal. filed Nov. 19, 
2012). A similar concern with the reputation of a deceased artist is raised by a recent social media feud 
between Kendall and Kylie Jenner and Voletta Wallace, mother of the Notorious B.I.G. The Jenners 
sold a t-shirt with their faces superimposed on the late rapper’s image, prompting Wallace to 
emphasize strongly on social media that there was no affiliation between the rapper’s estate and the 
Jenners: “I am not sure who told @kyliejenner and @kendalljenner that they had the right to do this. 
The disrespect of these girls to not even reach out to me or anyone connected to the estate baffles me.” 
See Shenequa Golding, Voletta Wallace to Kendall and Kylie: ‘This is Disgusting and Exploitation at 
its Worst’, VIBE (June 29, 2017, 2:08 PM), https://www.vibe.com/2017/06/voletta-wallace-reacts-
kendall-kylie-biggie-shirt/. 
166.  Rérolle, supra note 160. 
167.  Declaration of Connie Brooks, supra note 126, ¶ 37. 
168.  Id. ¶ 36.  
169.  Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motions for Permanent Injunction, supra 
note 149, at 33–34. 
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photos threatened to “taint Dale Earnhardt’s memory and image.”170 Jan 
Gaye, ex-wife of Marvin Gaye, testified at trial in the Blurred Lines 
litigation that her family grants licenses “depend[ing] on the integrity of 
what the license is about. And it's not always the amount. It's not always a 
financial issue. It's—some of it's emotional.”171 In the early 1970s, Robert 
and Michael Meeropol, the orphaned children of convicted Cold War spies 
Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, sued their parents’ trial lawyer for including 
the Rosenberg’s prison correspondence in a book about the trial.172 In one 
scene, for example, the book turned their parents’ first embrace since 
being sentenced to death “into a virtual sex scene from an R-rated 
movie.”173 The copyright suit began their decades-long effort to “correct 
[the] misrepresentations” about their parents—in particular, Ethel 
Rosenberg, who they maintain was entirely innocent.174 In each of these 
examples, family members are using the descendibility and exclusive 
rights of intellectual property to fill in the gaps of defamation and privacy 
laws to positively shape the memory of the decedent.175  
The desire to scrub clean the legacy of a deceased artist, however, is by 
no means always a noble cause. The struggle for control over the artist 
after death can be a continuation of a similar struggle for control during 
life. In this regard, Karen Carpenter’s posthumous IP disputes loom most 
ominously. Pop stars Karen Carpenter and her brother Richard developed 
a squeaky-clean all-American image in the 1970s, and Karen embodied 
                                                
170.  Id. at 34, n.10.  
171.  Transcript of Day Two of Trial Proceedings at 45, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. 
2:13-CV-06004-JAK-AGR, 2016 WL 6822309 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2016). According to Gaye, some of 
most important questions with respect to permissions include: “Are we diminishing the integrity of 
Marvin's music in any way by doing certain things? Are we disrespecting the music? Because it's so 
precious to us.” Id. at 48. 
172.  See Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977). 
173.  THE ROSENBERG LETTERS: A COMPLETE EDITION OF THE PRISON CORRESPONDENCE OF 
JULIUS AND ETHEL ROSENBERG 108 n.96 (Michael Meeropol ed., 1994) (“It was such total fabrications 
that led us to sue Nizer for both copyright infringement, invasion of privacy and libel, a suit that was 
settled out of court.”). 
174.  See, e.g., The Son of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg Writes of An Execution in the Family, 
AM. BOOKSELLERS ASS’N (June 10, 2003), http://www.bookweb.org/news/son-ethel-and-julius-
rosenberg-writes-execution-family; Marry C. Serreze, Meeropol Brothers to Seek Presidential 
Exoneration for Ethel Rosenberg at White House Gates, MASS LIVE (Nov. 28, 2016, 3:59 PM), 
http://www.masslive.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/11/ethel_rosenbergs_sons_plan_was.html 
[https://perma.cc/5XYU-27VJ]. 
175.  See also Fahmy v. Jay-Z, 835 F. Supp. 2d 783 (C.D. Cal. 2011). The nephew of Egyptian 
composer Baligh Hamdi sued Jay-Z over an allegedly unlawful sample in the hit song Big Pimpin’. 
The nephew “said the late composer would have been 'horrified' to learn his song had been combined 
with 'vulgar' rap lyrics in the track which extols the 'pimpin' life of casual sex.” Thomas Burrows, 
Judge Dismisses Copyright Claim Against Rapper Jay Z over His 1999 Track Big Pimpin', 
DAILYMAIL (Oct. 21, 2015, 6:25 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3283567/US-judge-
dismisses-Jay-Z-Big-Pimpin-copyright-case.html. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss3/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] IP, R.I.P.   673 
 
 	
“the role of star-struck female innocence.”176 Behind the scenes, however, 
Karen’s image and behavior were tightly controlled by her family, and 
after a lengthy battle with anorexia nervosa, she died at the age of thirty-
two. Her family continued to tightly control the use of her music and 
likeness after death in order “to maintain Karen’s marketability by 
reinforcing images of [her] virginal sainthood.” 177  Most famously, the 
Carpenter’s successfully sued director Todd Haynes for his film Superstar, 
which used Barbie dolls to depict Karen’s life, madness, and death. The 
film showed the slow degradation of Karen’s body and mind and strongly 
linked Karen’s condition with her “perversely overbearing family.”178 The 
family also sought to block the posthumous release of Karen’s solo 
recordings with Phil Ramone, which were far more sexually mature than 
the virginal Karen they had long promoted.179 These efforts to purify the 
memory of Karen Carpenter provide a stark reminder that dysfunction and 
mistreatment within families can continue after death. This potential does 
not mean that dignity interests are inherently improper. Again, it means 
that fair use and other free speech doctrines play especially important roles 
in ensuring cultural space for critique and commentary.  
E. Legacies 
One term emerges repeatedly in heirs’ explanation of why they are 
asserting IP rights: legacy. And they use this one term in several different 
ways. Family members feel a responsibility to actively promote their loved 
one’s “legacy” as a contributor to their field. They want to protect the 
deceased’s “legacy” from negative exploitation. They feel entitled to the 
economically valuable “legacy” that was explicitly left to them. 180 
“Legacy” takes on overlapping cultural, emotional, and economic 
meanings when invoked by IP estates.  
The Martin Luther King, Jr. estate frequently invokes King’s legacy in 
an economic sense. King’s family members see themselves as “guardians 
of King’s legacy,” and this includes enforcing IP rights against those who 
                                                
176.  Peggy J. Bowers & Stephanie Houston Grey, Karen: The Hagiographic Impulse in the 
Public Memory of a Pop Star, in AFTERLIFE AS AFTERIMAGE: UNDERSTANDING POSTHUMOUS FAME 
97, 99 (Steve Jones & Joli Jensen eds., 2005). 
177.  Id. at 102. 
178.  Id. at 110. 
179.  Id. at 113–14. 
180.  See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 33, Petrella v. MGM, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 
(2014) (No. 12-1315) (“To this day, MGM persists in infringing Ms. Petrella's copyright—and 
depriving her of her father's legacy—by continuing to market and sell the film.”). 
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seek to profit from it. 181  For example, in its suit against CBS for 
unauthorized use of the “I Have a Dream” speech, the estate repeatedly 
emphasized that King had protected, licensed, and enforced more than two 
dozen of his copyrighted works and “intended those copyright royalties as 
a ‘modest legacy’ for his family.”182 Family members and friends of King 
have emphasized that King was not a wealthy man and expected that his 
children would inherit the value of his intellectual property.183 According 
to former Atlanta Mayor Shirley Franklin, who frequently interacted with 
the King family: “Dr. King copyrighted his own work. . . . He expected 
that it would have value and expected it would be part of the legacy . . . 
Dr. King left the rest of us a tremendous legacy, but he was not a wealthy 
man.”184 This quote demonstrates the slipperiness of legacy in the context 
of IP estates; Dr. King’s economic legacy belongs to his children, but his 
tremendous cultural legacy belongs to “the rest of us.” 185 On one hand, 
King’s words and images are “the rightful inheritance of King’s family”; 
on the other hand, over time those words and images “belonged to 
everyone.”186 
                                                
181.  Krissah Thompson and Hamil R. Harris, Martin Luther King Jr.’s Children Reflect on the 
Weight of His Legacy, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/martin-
luther-king-jrs-children-reflect-on-the-weight-of-his-legacy/2011/08/24/gIQAHT6KcJ_story.html? 
utm_term=.12b23f23f9ff. 
182.  Brief for Appellant at 7, Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS Inc., 194 F.3d 1211 
(11th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-9079); see also id. at 10 (“Finally, the world-wide, commercial exploitation 
of the TV show and the exorbitant licensing fees exacted by CBS from non-profit organizations make 
a mockery of the First Amendment and fair use defenses, and Dr. King's desire to provide his family 
with an intellectual property legacy.”); Complaint ¶ 9, Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr. v. CBS Inc., 
13 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (No. 1:96-CV-03052-WCO) (“Dr. King's copyrighted works are 
part of his legacy, and Dr. King recognized the importance of protecting his copyrights in his writings. 
According to records in the Library of Congress, prior to his death Dr. King personally registered his 
copyrights in many other speeches, books, sermons and articles, including his 1965 ‘Address at the 
Conclusion of the Selma to Montgomery March’ and his 1967 ‘Declaration of Independence from the 
War in Vietnam.’”). 
183.  Gene Demby, King’s Family Builds Its Own Legacy of Legal Battles, NPR: CODE SWITCH 
(Jan. 18, 2015, 12:39 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/01/18/378015843/kings-
family-builds-its-own-legacy-of-legal-battles; see also Jenny Jarvie, Legal Battles of Martin Luther 
King Jr.’s Children Threaten His Legacy, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2015, 5:30 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-mlk-family-20150119-story.html. 
184.  Demby, supra note 183. 
185.  The heirs to another legendary civil rights activist, Malcolm X, have expressed a similar 
mix of economic and cultural interests. See Complaint ¶ 3, X Legacy, LLC v. Third World Press Inc., 
No. 13-CV-7984 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 8, 2013) (“His children assigned their interests . . . [to plaintiff 
holding company] so that their value could be best realized, and so that the legacy of Malcolm X could 
be best shared with the world.”). 
186.  Demby, supra note 183; see also James Bock, King’s Heirs Battle to Protect His Legacy, 
BALT. SUN (Jan. 19, 1994), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1994-01-19/news/1994019001_1_king-
estate-luther-king-king-legacy (“Speakers at Martin Luther King Jr. celebrations like to remind 
listeners that the slain civil rights leader's legacy belongs to all Americans. But Dr. King's heirs have 
increasingly issued another reminder: In a legal sense at least, that legacy belongs to them.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss3/3
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The Gaye family similarly expresses a strong economic claim to 
Marvin Gaye’s legacy but simultaneously see themselves as stewards of 
his cultural legacy. For example, Jan Gaye testified in the Blurred Lines 
trial: 
[W]e love the fact that people think of it as the ultimate party record 
from the ‘70's, from ‘77 to this day. And we're very proud of that. 
We're very proud of everything he did. It's part of what he left his 
children since he can't be here with us. It's a gift from him. So we 
treasure that and we value that.187 
“Gift” and “value” are intriguingly ambiguous concepts here, evoking 
both a cultural and an economic dimension. On one hand, Marvin’s 
daughter Nona Gaye describes the “painful joke” of Thicke and 
Williams’s copying “Got to Give it Up” in a highly proprietary way: 
“That’s our father, that’s what he left for us, our legacy.”188 On the other 
hand, the Gaye children have stressed that they are the “caretakers of such 
treasures” with a responsibility of “protecting the legacy of original 
artistry.”189 As IP heirs, they are accordingly purporting to act both on 
their own behalves and in furtherance of musical traditions generally. 
Ultimately, “we all feel like it's the living legacy that Marvin left behind 
for his children and family and his fans and for the world, really.”190 As 
the legacy shifts, however, from children to family to fans, its 
characteristics and obligations change quite substantially.  
Several other heirs have described themselves as stewards of a cultural 
legacy. For Connie Brooks, daughter of Cool Papa Bell, “I promised my 
father that I would carry on and keep his legacy alive. I have worked 
tirelessly for years by pushing ahead to make sure that he is not forgotten 
and that portrayals of him are accurate and appropriate.” 191  For 
Christopher Tolkien, his father’s legacy is “a patrimony which has been 
                                                
187.  Transcript of Day Two of Trial Proceedings, supra, note 171, at 43–44. 
188.  Nancy Dillon, Marvin Gaye’s Daughter Speaks About ‘Blurred Lines’ Court Decision: 
‘It’s a Beautiful Day’, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 11, 2015, 12:20 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/e 
ntertainment/music/marvin-gaye-daughter-speaks-court-decision-article-1.2144974. 
189.  Brittany Spanos, Marvin Gaye's Children: What Our Father Would Say About Lawsuit, 
ROLLING STONE (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/marvin-gayes-children-
what-our-father-would-say-about-lawsuit-20150318; see also Defendant’s Opening Statement, supra 
note 90, at 99 (“Marvin Gaye left his songs to his children. They are here protecting his work and his 
legacy.”). This “caretaker” motif invokes a long history of pro-copyright advocates using a 
parent/child metaphor to frame the relationship between authors and their work. See, e.g., Buccafusco 
& Fagundes, supra note 88, at 2477–78; MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF 
COPYRIGHT (1993); Lydia Pallas Loren, Abandoning the Orphans: An Open Access Approach to 
Hostage Works, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1431 (2012). 
190.  Transcript of Day Two of Trial Proceedings, supra, note 171, at 10. 
191.  Declaration of Connie Brooks, supra note 126, ¶ 9. 
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his life’s work.” This has involved both limiting commercial knockoffs 
and carefully completing and releasing his father’s stories.192 Gia Prima, 
the widow of swing musician Louis Prima, sees a similar role for herself 
in completing his “legacy”—publishing unreleased works, limiting 
authorized uses by commercial entities like the Olive Garden, and suing 
Disney for Jungle Book royalties. 193  Both Robyn Astaire and Teresa 
Earnhardt have taken on the roles of “guardian” and “caretaker” of their 
late husbands’ “legacies” and have clamped down on third-party uses of 
their inherited IP, to considerable criticism. 194 
The multiple, intertwined meanings of legacy invoked by IP estates 
encapsulates the intertwined and at times conflicting interests triggered by 
postmortem IP. As spouses, children, and grandchildren, they sometimes 
want to make sure that their family member is remembered fairly, 
accurately, and with dignity. As rights holders of often deeply important 
objects of culture, they sometimes want to make sure that their family 
member’s contributions maintain widespread cultural attention. As 
recipients of valuable inheritances, they sometimes want to materially 
improve their own economic conditions. And as private individuals 
mourning the death of a public figure, they sometimes just want to be left 
alone. What ultimately emerges from a close examination of IP estates’ 
expressed motivations is a much more complex and sympathetic—if not 
always likeable—cast of real-world characters than typically presented in 
IP debates. 
III. ESTATES IN BROADER CONTEXT  
In light of the various, and often conflicting, public policies triggered 
by the death of a famous artist (e.g., privacy, dignity, artistic expression, 
and free speech) the largely uniform scholarly attitude towards IP estates 
is rather startling. As shown in Part I, there has been little empathy 
directed towards the rights holders surveyed in Part II; even if the interests 
of IP estates ultimately must give way to larger societal commitments to a 
                                                
192.  Rérolle, supra note 160. 
193.  Prima v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337, 350 (D.N.J. 2000) (finding prima 
facie case of right of publicity violation); Keith Spera, Louis Prima's Legacy Was Incomplete Until 
2002, When His Wife Reissued Long-Lost Songs, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Oct. 13, 2002, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.nola.com/music/index.ssf/2002/10/post_12.html; Mark Miester, The Monkey v. the Mouse, 
BEST OF NEW ORLEANS (Aug. 21, 2001), http://m.bestofneworleans.com/gambit/the-monkey-vs-the-
mouse/Content?oid=1239351.  
194.  Thomas, supra note 117; Jeff Owens, How Teresa Earnhardt Is Tarnishing Dale 
Earnhardt’s Name and Legacy, SPORTING NEWS (May 9, 2016), http://www.sportingnews.com 
/nascar/news/teresa-earnhardt-lawsuit-controversy-dale-earnhardt-name-legacy-kerry-dale-earnhardt-
jr/9knelm180kop141brytlirn6g. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss3/3
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robust public domain, that ultimate policy decision is not without cost or 
consequence. This strong skepticism towards estates also stands in 
significant contrast with the far more diverse views about the interests of 
heirs in other areas of legal scholarship. The interests of heirs set forth in 
Part II are far from unique to IP, yet the response by scholars in other 
domains has been far more sympathetic, even when not ultimately more 
supportive.  
In the area of law that addresses death and inheritance most directly—
trusts and estates—the substantial, and often disenfranchised, interests of 
heirs and familial beneficiaries loom large. Trusts and estates doctrines 
reflect a constant triangulation among three sets of interests: decedents’ 
“freedom of disposition” with respect to their property; living 
beneficiaries’ economic and emotional interests in the decedent’s property; 
and the broader societal interest in the fair and efficient use of economic 
resources.195 U.S. trusts and estates law largely comes down on the side of 
the freedom of disposition, giving decedents wide latitude to disinherit 
dependent family members or bind their property in service of suboptimal 
ends. 196  In only limited, fairly extreme circumstances will U.S. law 
unsettle or otherwise redirect property away from the decedent’s desired 
plans.197 As a result, family members can be entirely cut out of a lawful 
estate plan, 198  regardless of their economic vulnerabilities or strong 
emotional attachments to heirlooms that have been directed elsewhere.  
Numerous scholars have pushed back forcefully against the priorities of 
U.S. trusts and estates law, often carrying a brief for marginalized family 
members. For example, scholars have argued that disinherited children 
should have the right to claim a portion of their parent’s estate—similar to 
the rights of disinherited spouses in separate property states to claim a 
                                                
195.  See, e.g., Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post 
Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125 (2013) (analyzing when freedom of disposition should be 
limited by negative externalities or donees’ ex post interests).  
196.  See, e.g., MADOFF, supra note 16, at 6–7 (“Americans are largely free to impose whatever 
conditions they want, and their plans can often be imposed for as long as they want, even in 
perpetuity.”); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (“In one form or another, the right to pass on 
property—to one’s family in particular—has been part of the Anglo-American legal system since 
feudal times.”). 
197.  For example, a decedent’s will cannot direct the destruction of the family home. Eyerman 
v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). Nor can it unreasonably interfere with a 
family member’s decision of whom to marry. Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 829 
(Com. Pl. 1974) (permitting a reasonable restraint on marriage). But the decedent can bind a trustee to 
pursue questionably necessary charitable ends. Estate of Buck v. Marin Cmty. Found., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
442 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). The decedent may also place relatively onerous conditions on their 
children’s inheritances, such as requiring them to marry a person of a particular religion. Shapira, 315 
N.E.2d at 825. 
198.  See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Book Review: Will Contests, 103 YALE L.J. 2039 (1994). 
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share of their spouse’s estate.199  Scholars have also argued for greater 
flexibility in modifying trusts in light of changing circumstances, again 
largely out of concern that a trust ultimately should function for the benefit 
of its beneficiaries and not out of pure fealty to the wishes of a settlor who 
had died decades earlier. 200  Although there certainly are scholars who 
support the foundational commitment to freedom of disposition,201 I am 
unaware of any recent scholarship that fails to at least acknowledge its 
burden on family members with a stake in the decedent’s property. 
Trusts and estates scholars furthermore have expressly recognized that 
successful estate planning cannot be disentangled from family members’ 
emotional attachments. Professors Deborah Gordon and Karen Sneddon, 
for example, advocate that decedents incorporate personal narratives about 
their property into their will in order to aid in bereavement and help reduce 
conflict around inheritance decisions.202 Moreover, Professor Gordon and 
other trusts and estates scholars recognize that “[a] possession, be it a 
keepsake, jewelry, a home, or even a business, often takes on meaning that 
is unrelated to the item’s material worth or market value.”203 Therefore, it 
is perfectly understandable that family members will act economically 
“irrationally” in service of their tremendous emotional investments. 204 
Inheritance is not just about the intergenerational transfer of an 
economically valuable asset; it is also about “creat[ing] a legacy that 
connects that individual to her survivors and allows her to live on after 
death.”205 Professor Shelly Kreiczer-Levy similarly argues that inheritance 
law creates an “intergenerational bond.”206 The decedent extends herself 
                                                
199.  See, e.g., Deborah A. Batts, I Didn’t Ask to Be Born: The American Law of Disinheritance 
and a Proposal for Change to a System of Protected Inheritance, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1197 (1990); 
Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 83 (1994); Paul 
G. Haskell, The Power of Disinheritance: Proposal for Reform, 52 GEO. L.J. 499 (1964). 
200.  See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 
1105, 1111 (2004). 
201.  See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 195; David Horton, Testation and Speech, 101 GEO. L.J. 61 
(2012); Joshua C. Tate, Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 42 U. CAL. DAVIS L. 
REV. 129 (2008). 
202.  Deborah S. Gordon, Mor[t]ality and Identity: Wills, Narratives, and Cherished 
Possessions, 28 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 265 (2016); see also Karen J. Sneddon, The Will as Personal 
Narrative, 20 ELDER L.J. 355 (2013); Jane B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation, and Stories, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 630 (1992). 
203.  See Gordon, supra note 202; see also Eduardo M. Penalver, Property’s Memories, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1071 (2011); Horton, supra note 201, at 88 (“[B]eneficiaries perceive owners’ 
distributional choices as a proxy for their voice and an extension of their affection.”); Margaret Jane 
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959–60 (1982). 
204.  Gordon, supra note 202, at 276 (“[P]roperty that may seem insignificant based on 
economic value alone has tremendous expressive, and in particular narrative, potential.”). 
205.  Id. at 275–76. 
206.  Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Inheritance Legal Systems and the Intergenerational Bond, 46 
REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 495, 495 (2012). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss3/3
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into the future, and the beneficiary maintains a bond with the past by 
becoming a caretaker for the decedent’s legacy: “a beneficiary who 
becomes the caretaker of a cherished object satisfies a moral obligation to 
members of her intergenerational community.” 207  Trusts and estates 
scholars often take very seriously the emotional components of a 
decedent’s legacy; empathy in estate planning can both reduce conflict and 
help achieve common ground in the emotionally fraught aftermath of a 
person’s death.208  
Other areas of law also regularly confront and acknowledge the 
difficult balancing of interests between decedents, survivors, and the 
general public. In the context of bodily dispositions—i.e. decisions about 
whether to bury or cremate a corpse—and organ donation, applicable state 
and national laws have variously shifted between: (1) prioritizing the 
general public’s interest in the body for scientific research or medical 
transplants; (2) recognizing the interests of family members in making 
decisions about what happens to their loved one’s remains; and (3) 
respecting the decedent’s own desires about whether to donate their bodies 
to science and medicine.209  Both to empower grieving families and to 
                                                
207.  Gordon, supra note 202, at 314; see also Gregory S. Alexander, Intergenerational 
Communities, 8 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 21, 23 (2014) (“I argue further that each generational 
community owes its predecessors the obligation to accept life-transcending projects transmitted to 
them by their forebears and make reasonable efforts to carry those projects forward into the future.”); 
Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 764 (2009) (recognizing “an 
innate desire among the living to honor the wishes of the dead even when those wishes negatively 
impact their own interests”); Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 206, at 521 (“The giver connects to her future 
by bequeathing her property while the receiver has an interest in belonging and in having roots, and 
the property reaffirms the receiver’s place in the world.”). 
208.  See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, The “Estate Planning” Counselor and Values Destroyed by 
Death, 55 IOWA L. REV. 376, 376 (1969) (“Lawyers who advise clients and draft documents in the 
‘estate planning’ practice . . . live with their clients an experience which results in change and in 
choice. They are companions in another man's world.”); see also Horton, supra note 201, at 86–87 
(“[D]isgruntled beneficiaries are notoriously litigious. . . . These beneficiaries are not fighting the 
pecuniary value of the gifts. Instead, they are challenging something else: the message encoded in the 
testamentary scheme.”). 
209.  Smolensky, supra note 207, at 773 (“Possible right-holders in cases involving decedents 
might include the decedent, the estate, heirs, the public, and the next of kin.”); see also Radhika Rao, 
Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 402–09 (2000) (canvassing conflicting 
decisions on the constitutionality of state statutes authorizing removal of organs from dead bodies 
without prior consent); David Horton, Indescendibility, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 543, 547 (2014) 
(supporting certain limits on posthumous transfers, for example in decedent’s body parts, on the basis 
of “administrability” problems); id. at 555–56 (canvassing gradual shift from denying property 
treatment to cadavers to giving families a “quasi-property” interest in ensuring proper handling); see 
MADOFF, supra note 16, at 16–34 (chronicling legal developments from the common law principle of 
corpus nullius in bonis through contemporary burial/cremation and organ donation statutes). Some 
scholars believe that families now have too much decisional authority and advocate a more 
individualized focus on what the decedent wanted to happen. See, e.g., Frances H. Foster, 
Individualized Justice in Disputes over Dead Bodies, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1351 (2008); Tanya K. 
Hernández, The Property of Death, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 971 (1999). 
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increase the supply of transplantable organs, several scholars have 
advocated increased decision-making authority for surviving family 
members, including some degree of economic stake in what can often be a 
valuable resource for medical treatment and research.210 Although legal 
scholarship is all over the map in terms of how to balance the competing 
interests in human remains, the important takeaway is that scholars 
recognize and appreciate how difficult it is to accommodate competing 
claims among heirs, decedents, and the public. 
Similarly, several scholars have emphasized the importance of limiting 
public disclosure of certain types of information about the decedent, such 
as genetic information, autopsy reports, or death certificates. 211  For 
example, one of the most famous examples of bioethics and family 
privacy involves the descendants of Henrietta Lacks, a black tobacco 
farmer whose cancer cells were taken without her knowledge in 1951 and 
used to develop some of the most important advances in modern 
medicine.212 Although the HeLa cell line has been invaluable for scientific 
research, its development has also been subject to much criticism—her 
family members were unaware of the HeLa cell line provenance until the 
1970s and were themselves unable to afford health insurance or any of the 
medical advancements to which Henrietta Lacks had contributed.213  
Moreover, in 2013, German researchers sequenced and published the 
Lacks genome, prompting criticism that this information violated the 
privacy of Henrietta’s descendants because it could allow researchers to 
identify their potential risk for a range of diseases.214 Even though this 
genetic information provided an invaluable reference tool for medical 
research, the National Institutes of Health chose to limit access only to 
researchers who submitted applications and agreed to abide by the “HeLa 
Genome Data Use Agreement.” According to the NIH Director: 
The sequencing and posting of the HeLa genome brought into sharp 
                                                
210.  See Horton, supra note 209, at 554 n.74 (collecting sources); see also id., at 589 
(supporting experimentation with some financial payment to decedents’ families for organ harvesting). 
211.  See generally Natalie M. Banta, Death and Privacy in the Digital Age, 94 N.C. L. REV. 
927 (2016). 
212.  See Radhika Rao, Informed Consent, Body Property, and Self-Sovereignty, 44 J. L. MED. & 
ETHICS 437, 438 (2016); Natalie Ram, DNA By the Entirety, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 873 (2015). 
213.  Rao, supra note 212, at 441–42; Robin McKie, Henrietta Lacks’s Cells Were Priceless, 
But Her Family Can’t Afford a Hospital, GUARDIAN (Apr. 3, 2010, 7:06 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/apr/04/henrietta-lacks-cancer-cells; see generally REBECCA 
SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS (2010). 
214.  See SKLOOT, supra note 213; see also Rebecca Skloot, The Immortal Life of Henrietta 
Lacks, the Sequel, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/24/opinion/sund 
ay/the-immortal-life-of-henrietta-lacks-the-sequel.html (“‘That is private family information,’ said Jeri 
Lacks-Whye, Lacks’s granddaughter. “‘It shouldn’t have been published without our consent.’”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss3/3
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relief important ethical and policy issues . . . . To understand the 
family’s perspectives, we met with them face to face three times 
over four months, and listened carefully to their concerns. 
Ultimately, we arrived at a path forward that respects their wishes 
and allows science to progress. We are indebted to the Lacks family 
for their generosity and thoughtfulness.215 
Even though the HeLa genome provides a compelling case for a robust 
public domain, privacy advocates and bioethicists listened and responded 
to claims of family privacy, particularly where the family had been largely 
shut out of the economic upside of their ancestor’s contribution.216  
Despite similar public interests militating in favor of the disclosure of 
autopsy reports and death certificates to journalists and scholars, many 
states (with scholarly support) limit access to death certificates to certain 
close family members.217  “Many courts justify these access restrictions 
based upon the right to privacy held by the decedent’s family that ‘protects 
people from suffering the unhappiness of unwanted publicity about their 
deceased relatives.’”218 Similarly, the Supreme Court upheld the denial of 
a Freedom of Information Act request where the disclosure of death-scene 
photographs of Bill Clinton aide Vince Foster would have violated the 
privacy interests of Foster’s surviving family members. 219  The Court 
affirmed the interest of the Foster family “to secure their own refuge from 
                                                
215.  See Press Release, Nat’l Insts. of Health, NIH, Lacks Family Reach Understanding To 
Share Genomic Data of HeLa Cells (Aug. 7, 2013), https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-
releases/nih-lacks-family-reach-understanding-share-genomic-data-hela-cells. 
216.  See Rao, supra note 212, at 441–42. Professor Rao also points to the experience of the 
Havasupai Tribe, which provided blood samples to Arizona State University to research the high rates 
of diabetes within the tribe. The University conducted additional research on the blood samples and 
published papers reporting a high degree of inbreeding within the tribe and suggesting that the tribe’s 
ancestors migrated across the frozen Bering Sea. These conclusions were insulting to the tribe and 
contradicted tribal origin stories. Although the tribe failed to hold the university accountable through 
litigation, it ultimately reached a settlement whereby the university paid tribal member $700,000 and 
returned the remaining blood samples. Id. at 438–39. 
217.  Jeffrey R. Boles, Documenting Death: Public Access to Government Death Records and 
Attendant Privacy Concerns, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 237, 239 (2012) (“Public access to death 
certificates, autopsy reports, and other types of government-held death records, a seemingly benign 
legal topic, has generated robust disagreement, pitting open government principles against privacy 
concerns surrounding the deceased.”); Smolensky, supra note 207, at 796–97. 
218.  Boles, supra note 217, at 241 (quoting Metter v. L.A. Exam’r, 95 P.2d 491, 495 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1939)). 
219.  Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004); see also Catsouras v. 
Dept. of Cal. Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (permitting family of 
decedent to assert cause of action against California Highway Patrol for disclosure of young woman’s 
mutilated corpse). 
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a sensation-seeking culture for their own peace of mind and tranquility.”220 
Justice Kennedy cited at length a sworn declaration from Foster’s sister: 
Sheila Foster Anthony, stated that the family had been harassed by, 
and deluged with requests from, “[p]olitical and commercial 
opportunists” who sought to profit from Foster's suicide . . . “I fear 
that the release of [additional] photographs certainly would set off 
another round of intense scrutiny by the media . . . Once again my 
family would be the focus of conceivably unsavory and distasteful 
media coverage.” . . . “[R]eleasing any photographs . . . would 
constitute a painful unwarranted invasion of my privacy, my 
mother's privacy, my sister's privacy, and the privacy of Lisa Foster 
Moody (Vince's widow), her three children, and other members of 
the Foster family."221 
Foster Anthony’s declaration echoes many of the interests set forth in Part 
II—family privacy, commercial exploitation, and reputational purity—and 
the Supreme Court expressly weighed these interests against the 
correspondingly strong public interest in the details of Foster’s death. 
“Family members have a personal stake in honoring and mourning their 
dead and objecting to unwarranted public exploitation that, by intruding 
upon their own grief, tends to degrade the rites and respect they seek to 
accord to the deceased person who was once their own.” 222  Privacy 
scholars have been largely sympathetic to this view, even if also highly 
sympathetic to the corresponding burden on press freedoms.223 
Business law scholars have also considered potential conflicts between 
the interests of families and the general public. Professors Benjamin 
Means and Allison Tait have recently emphasized that family-operated 
businesses are often valuable inherited assets and can serve a range of 
important noneconomic interests. Professor Tait observes that family-
operated firms seek to preserve “socioemotional wealth” in addition to 
profit margins and shareholder value.224 This includes “preservation of a 
positive family image, concerns about the company’s perpetuation, desire 
                                                
220.  Favish, 541 U.S. at 158. 
221.  Id. at 167 (internal citations omitted). 
222.  Id. at 168.  
223.  See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Salvaging Privacy & Tranquility From The Wreckage: Images Of 
Death, Emotions Of Distress & Remedies Of Tort In The Age Of The Internet, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
311 (2010); Samuel A. Terilli & Sigman L. Splichal, Public Access to Autopsy and Death-Scene 
Photographs: Relational Privacy, Public Records and Avoidable Collisions, 10 COMM. L. & POL'Y 
313, 345 (2005); Richard J. Peltz, Fifteen Minutes of Infamy: Privileged Reporting and the Problem of 
Perpetual Reputational Harm, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 717, 744 (2008); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, 
Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 863–64 (2000). 
224.  Allison Tait, Corporate Family Law, 112 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss3/3
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of family members to influence decisions, and care for acquaintances and 
community relations.” 225  According to Professor Means, “Family 
businesses seek to advance collective goals, economic and noneconomic; 
they are contractual, but also reflect status-based family relationships.”226 
Even though certain business-related decisions may impose social costs, 
for example denying employees insurance coverages for birth control, they 
nonetheless might be consistent with the family’s strongly held beliefs and 
values.227 Although family values—i.e. intimacy and emotional bonds—
would appear to conflict with the market values—i.e. efficiency and 
transparency—that tend to drive corporate regulation, they do not argue 
that family values should be discarded. To the contrary, each argues that 
courts and lawmakers should try and accommodate and adapt to the needs 
of family-operated businesses, particularly in potential moments of 
internal conflict, such as the transition of control from parents to 
children.228 Professor Means accordingly encourages lawyers to appreciate 
their clients’ mix of family and business motives, and to “take special care 
to explore questions, such as succession and estate planning, that are 
critical to the success of the venture.”229  
The above paragraphs are hardly an exhaustive survey of scholarly 
treatment of family members’ socioemotional interests in a parent or 
spouse’s assets. What they highlight, however, is that scholars in other 
areas of law confronting families, succession, property, and/or privacy 
have grappled with the difficulty of navigating and balancing the interests 
of heirs, decedents, and the general public. A broad range of scholars 
outside of IP have recognized that family members have a powerful mix of 
emotional and economic attachments to what a deceased relative has left 
behind, whether it is a business, belongings, or a body.230 Strong desires 
for privacy are not dismissed out of hand as censorship; decisions 
reflecting a strongly-held value system are not immediately tossed aside as 
irrational; and economic vulnerabilities are not branded as greed. Instead, 
heirs’ interests are taken seriously and factor into the overall debate about 
how to craft a legal rule in light of the competing costs and benefits. This 
                                                
225.  Id. 
226.  Benjamin Means, Nonmarket Values in Family Businesses, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1185, 1230 (2013). 
227.  Tait, supra note 224; see also Means, supra note 226, at 1210 (“[I]ndividuals may find 
themselves torn between advancing the interests of the business and upholding their obligations as 
members of a family.”). 
228.  Tait, supra note 224; Means, supra note 226, at 1215 (“Nowhere are the difficulties of 
balancing family and business values more formidable than in the transfer of control form one 
generation to the next.”). 
229.  Means, supra note 226, at 1235. 
230.  See also Radin, supra note 35. 
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does not mean casting aside social welfare or the public domain, and there 
are vigorous debates in each of these areas about how to address and 
accommodate all the interests at stake.  
IP law and policy would benefit greatly from an analogous debate that 
recognizes and takes seriously the competing interests that are actually at 
stake in many contemporary disputes. IP disputes need not be framed 
simplistically and antagonistically in terms of the public domain versus 
various categories of greedy rights holders. Instead, they might at least 
acknowledge the difficult mix of important social, economic, and 
emotional values triggered by the succession of popular culture from one 
generation to the next.  
Other areas of law recognize the mix of interests exercised by heirs, 
and then explicitly balance them against competing interests. Sometimes 
surviving family members get much of the benefit and control they desire, 
sometimes they get very little, and often the law is a compromise among 
the interests of the decedent, survivor, and general public. IP doctrines on 
their surface share this posture of compromise—rights holders (both ante- 
and postmortem) have broadly framed, exclusive rights over the use of 
certain writings, inventions, likenesses, and symbols, tempered by a wide 
assortment of exceptions and limits in service of a wide range of 
expressive, scientific, and economic concerns. But rarely are the interests 
on rights holders’ side of the ledger framed in terms of the actual diverse 
mix of interests served by IP protections—they are framed largely in terms 
of an increasingly discredited theory that authors, inventors, and 
celebrities need monetary incentives in order to invest time and energy 
into the production of nonrival, intangible goods. When framed in terms of 
incentives to create, IP estates stand on rather shaky ground—they never 
created anything in the first place, so what is the point of giving them so 
much power? By contrast, when framed in terms of the mix of economic 
and emotional interests set forth in Part II, postmortem IP protections map 
much more neatly onto a coherent set of real world needs and serve a 
group of interests that legal scholars have often embraced.  
IV. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PARALLEL MOURNING 
By largely overlooking the interests of IP estates, two types of 
disconnect have taken hold. First, the discourse of postmortem rights is 
largely framed in terms of windfalls to children with no legitimate claim to 
the rights they inherit and assert. As this Article has demonstrated, 
however, IP estates are employing powerful narratives of legacy, 
recognition, privacy, and fairness that are doing real work in invoking the 
sympathy of judges, juries, and lawmakers. These narratives can’t be 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss3/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] IP, R.I.P.   685 
 
 	
easily framed in terms of economic incentives or authors’ rights, so it is 
difficult for them to be embraced explicitly in judicial opinions.231 The 
dominant IP narratives accordingly don’t reflect the full range interests 
doing work below the surface. Second, the combination of villainization 
and inattention toward IP estates has resulted in doctrines that poorly 
reflect the interests of the family members who inherit several decades of 
exclusive rights and in a relative dearth of scholarly attention on how to 
help family members better manage IP. This Article concludes by 
imagining a more transparent discourse of postmortem IP and suggests 
some ways for IP law and practice to reflect this reimagined discourse.  
A. Theory 
What emerges from the analysis above is a notion of what I call 
“parallel mourning.” Families, fans, scholars, and journalists are engaging 
in simultaneous, intersecting acts of processing, remembering, 
contextualizing, and coping with the loss of a famous person. These 
processes often conflict in operation, but they are triggered by the same 
event. 
Most significantly, the interests expressed by IP estates emphasize that 
families’ ownership and stewardship of IP are often inextricable from their 
personal connections to the decedent and inseparable from their mourning 
of the loss of a family member. For example, Tina Sinatra, director of 
Frank Sinatra Enterprises, has confessed about her father that “she can’t 
‘separate [her]self’ from him; that her father is with her ‘every second of 
every minute of every hour of every day.’”232 Marvin Gaye’s children 
similarly have written, “We will celebrate what would have been our dad’s 
76th birthday next month, and though we miss him every day – just like 
the many thousands of well-wishers who have expressed their heartfelt 
goodwill – it is through his music that we find our compass and our paths 
moving forward.” 233  Christopher Tolkien describes having his father’s 
“voice in my ear,” directing him as he became “the historian of the work, 
its interpreter.”234  
                                                
231.  See, e.g., Garcia v. Google, Inc. 786 F. 3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015) (“In broad terms, ‘the 
protection of privacy is not a function of the copyright law . . . To the contrary, the copyright law 
offers a limited monopoly to encourage ultimate public access to the creative work of the author.’”) 
(quoting Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir. 2003)); id. (“Likewise, authors cannot seek 
emotional distress damages under the Copyright Act, because such damages are unrelated to the value 
and marketability of their works.”). 
232.  See Andrew Gilden, Sinatra’s Mug and Postmortem Publicity Rights, PRAWFSBLAWG 
(Dec. 11, 2015, 5:53 PM), https://perma.cc/T8GW-LM6J. 
233.  Spanos, supra note 189. 
234.  Rérolle, supra note 160. 
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One understandable response to these sentiments is to dismiss them as 
fetishistic attachments to the deceased; that the Gayes, Sinatras, and 
Tolkiens should move on with their lives rather than continue holding on 
to their parents’ legacies. Indeed, literary scholar Professor Paul Saint-
Amour has argued that postmortem copyright might assist with family 
mourning for a “circumscribed” period, but counters that a lengthy 
postmortem term can contribute to an “interminable mourning” and 
prolonged “psychic trauma” of attachment to the deceased and unhealthy 
opposition to more communal forms of public mourning.235 In his view, 
“the grief-stricken culture of copyright maximalism wishes the 
annihilation of the public domain.”236 
This response, however, is at odds with the growing consensus among 
contemporary bereavement scholars about the possibilities and goals of 
mourning. The earlier Freudian model of mourning, expressly employed 
by Professor Saint Amour, posits the goal of mourning as relinquishing 
attachment to a deceased family member—disengage, let go, move 
forward.237 Contemporary psychologists and grief scholars see this goal as 
often unrealistic and unhealthy. Instead, the dominant paradigm has been 
termed “continuing bonds”—mourning is about working through and 
navigating an ongoing relationship between the living and the dead.238 
Continuing bonds may mean a more enduring presence of the dead in the 
life of the living, but it also helps reinforce a sense of identity, family 
belonging, and life-transcending purpose. Bereavement scholars have 
embraced a model of healthy continued attachments to the deceased that 
parallels the insights of many of the legal scholars in Part III—managing a 
family business or continuing a loved one’s charitable work or caring for 
family heirlooms can be a constructive and empowering aspect of 
intergenerational exchange. 
When postmortem IP is viewed in light of the idea of continuing bonds, 
it is easier to see how third party uses of the decedent’s work or image can 
conflict with family mourning. For example, the public representation of 
                                                
235.  SAINT-AMOUR, supra note 52, at 205. 
236.  Id. at 156. 
237.  Id. at 154, n.53. Freud describes the work of mourning as “[t]he testing of reality, having 
shown that the loved object no longer exists, requires forthwith that all the libido shall be withdrawn 
from its attachment to this object . . . when the work of mourning is completed the ego becomes free 
and uninhibited again.” Id. (quoting SIGMUND FREUD, GENERAL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY: PAPERS 
ON METAPSYCHOLOGY 165–66 (Philip Rieff ed. 1963)). 
238.  See generally Robert A. Neimeyer et al., Continuing Bonds and Reconstructing Meaning: 
Mitigating Complications in Bereavement, 30 DEATH STUD. 715 (2006); DENNIS KLASS ET AL., 
CONTINUING BONDS: NEW UNDERSTANDINGS OF GRIEF (1994). 
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the deceased strongly shapes the family’s grieving process,239 and it can be 
particularly important for grieving family members to establish and 
maintain a positive narrative about the deceased.240 Although this might 
take the form of trying to suppress critical, albeit truthful, portrayals of the 
deceased, this desire for suppression at least bears a coherence to a 
reasonable human psychological process as opposed to an irrational, 
narcissistic hunger for censorship. Moreover, individuals vary greatly in 
terms of how public they are comfortable being with their mourning. For 
individuals who seek a relatively private form of grief, the pervasive 
presence of the deceased on social and traditional media can thwart this 
process.241 It can be difficult to constantly see the face or hear the voice of 
someone whose death you are trying to adjust to. 
Even though a celebrity’s families and fans may both mourn the 
celebrity’s death, death has a qualitatively different impact on the two sets 
of mourners. The physical death of a celebrity causes a fundamental shift 
for individuals who knew them personally; there is less of qualitative shift 
for fans and the general public. For most fans, the relationship with a 
“star,” both before and after death, is highly mediated, both by recording 
technologies and telecommunications advances.242 The vast majority of 
fans of a famous deceased musician, such as Prince or Kurt Cobain or 
Michael Jackson, “know” the musician through audio and video 
recordings that preserve their image and voice,243 and although physical 
death forecloses the supply of “new” recordings, fans can engage with the 
deceased artist in death much the same way as they did during life. 
“Though their physical being is gone, it was never physically before us, 
and our interaction with them can be little changed, if at all.”244 The rise of 
the Internet and social media has substantially increased the social 
                                                
239.  Jo Bell et al., ‘We Do it to Keep Him Alive’: Bereaved Individuals’ Experiences of Online 
Suicide Memorials and Continuing Bonds, 20 MORTALITY 375, 377 (2015) (citing David R. Unruh, 
Death and Personal History: Strategies of Identity Preservation, 30 SOC. PROBS. 340 (1983)). 
240.  Id. at 381, 384 (citing John H. Harvey et al., Embracing Their Memory: The Construction 
of Accounts of Loss and Hope, in MEANING RECONSTRUCTION AND THE EXPERIENCE OF LOSS 213 
(Robert A. Neimeyer ed. 2001)). 
241.  Id. at 385. 
242.  See Andy Bennett, Mediation, Generational Memory and the Dead Music Icon, in DEATH 
AND THE ROCK STAR 61, 62 (Catherine Strong & Barbara LeBrun eds., 2015) (“Thus, rock and pop 
artists from the 1950s onwards, whether they are today living or dead, have been experienced 
primarily as mediations—as images on a screen, as sounds and voices on a vinyl album or CD, as 
figures on a stage whose music is conveyed electronically . . . .”) 
243.  RICHARD DYER, STARS 2 (1986). 
244.  Steve Jones, Echo Homo, in AFTERLIFE AS AFTERIMAGE: UNDERSTANDING POSTHUMOUS 
FAME 269, 274 (Steve Jones & Joli Jensen eds., 2005). 
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presence of celebrities in the public’s day-to-day lives, but that presence is 
largely metaphysical, both before AND after death.245  
Today’s major “stars” are both “private persons”—flesh-and-blood 
human beings with families and childhood friends—and “legends”—
widely shared cultural symbols. 246  The widespread remixing and 
repackaging that attends public mourning of a cultural legend can be 
difficult for the individuals who are working through the permanent loss of 
the private person. “[A] dead celebrity is commodified along with his or 
her death, in a manner perhaps morbidly similar to embalming or 
mummifying, and exhumed each time the deceased-as-commodity 
circulates through the media and through culture.”247 Unauthorized uses of 
a deceased celebrity’s work can accordingly feel to family members like a 
metaphysical resurrection of the dead. For example, Jan Gaye repeatedly 
refers to “Blurred Lines” as “breathing new life” into Marvin Gaye’s 
work—on one hand, it reminds the family and the public about one of her 
“personal favorites”; on the other hand, the family was extremely 
frustrated that there had been no permission and no credit.248 Third-party 
uses thus trigger a complex mix of emotions for the decedent’s family 
members—they can potentially provide an opportunity to jointly celebrate 
an artist’s legacy, but they can also involuntarily resurrect the artist and 
supplant the family’s position within a social hierarchy of mourning.249  
It might be countered that even if this experience of usurped mourning 
is sincere, the acute sense of grief suffered by a handful of individuals 
should nonetheless give way to the widespread cultural desire to celebrate, 
remember, and rediscover the treasures left behind. This individual has 
achieved the dream of so many struggling artists and ascended to the 
status of cultural legend; even if the private person is gone, they have 
achieved a sort of cultural immortality that should be celebrated by our 
legal system. They have transcended the physical body and become a 
                                                
245.  See Tony Walter et al., Does the Internet Change How We Die and Mourn? An Overview, 
64 OMEGA 275, 292, 294 (2012). 
246.  Marko Aho, A Career in Music: From Obscurity to Immortality, in AFTERLIFE AS 
AFTERIMAGE: UNDERSTANDING POSTHUMOUS FAME 237, 242 (Steve Jones & Joli Jensen eds., 2005). 
247.  Steve Jones, Better Off Dead: Or, Making it the Hard Way, in AFTERLIFE AS AFTERIMAGE: 
UNDERSTANDING POSTHUMOUS FAME 3, 6 (Steve Jones & Joli Jensen eds., 2005); see also Bennett, 
supra note 242, at 66. 
248.  Transcript of Day Two of Trial Proceedings, supra, note 171, at 11. 
249.  See Patricia Robson & Tony Walter, Hierarchies of Loss: A Critique of Disenfranchised 
Grief, 66 OMEGA 97, 109 (2012) (“Our contention therefore is that disenfranchisement is not a norm, 
but a feeling experienced by mourners whose personal grief exceeds their position in the hierarchy 
either as generally perceived or as perceived by one or more significant condolers.”). 
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cultural resource.250  Artists’ families should embrace their loved ones’ 
exalted place within the pantheon of the public domain.  
There are considerable dangers in asking families to get out of the way 
of the public domain, or at least an overly romanticized notion of the 
public domain. It may be tempting to cast deceased artists’ work as 
“resources” or “raw materials” for future artists,251 but too often these 
monikers have a way of overlooking the problematic cultural conditions in 
which these works were produced and the range of adversities confronting 
the artists themselves.252 Asking families to embrace their loved ones’ new 
status as cultural raw materials metaphorically asks them to accept that 
their loved one has returned to the dirt, as fertile soil for future generations 
to chew up and process in whatever forms they choose. But this cultural 
chewing-up of artists, unfortunately, does not begin at death; instead, as 
shown in many of the stories set forth in Part II, individuals like Bessie 
Smith, Jack Kirby, Randy California, Rex Woodward, Jean-Michel 
Basquiat, and Cool Papa Bell were subjected to a diverse range of 
mistreatment during their lives, and their family members sought to make 
sure that this mistreatment wasn’t glossed over after their deaths.  
Entertainment industries sadly have a troubling track record of building 
up and then ultimately tearing down the individuals who labor on their 
behalf. Celebrity culture entices creators with fame, wealth, and adoration, 
but it provides little in the way of tools to deal with them.253 The result, too 
often, is an early death;254 overdoses, suicides, and murders have taken the 
lives of a shocking number of cultural icons, from Kurt Cobain to Amy 
Winehouse to Jean-Michel Basquiat to Marvin Gaye to Whitney Houston 
to Michael Jackson and on and on and on. Too often these premature 
                                                
250.  See Joli Jensen, On Fandom, Celebrity, and Mediation: Posthumous Possibilities, in 
AFTERLIFE AS AFTERIMAGE: UNDERSTANDING POSTHUMOUS FAME xv, xx (Steve Jones & Joli Jensen 
eds., 2005) (“[W]e also use celebrities, especially safely dead celebrities, as a cultural resource.”). 
251.  See, e.g., Spoo, supra note 59, at 107–10. 
252.  See Gilden, supra note 137, at 382–86; Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The 
Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CALIF. L REV. 1331, 1341 (2004) (“The public domain movement 
leaves the common person to the mercy of an unregulated marketplace where she must struggle to 
realize her rights.”). See generally Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge., 70 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 97 (2007). 
253.  Daniel Harris, Celebrity Deaths, 66 ANTIOCH REV. 616, 623 (2008) (“A culture that truly 
respected and needed its artists would create for them the conditions of personal stability necessary for 
their survival, whereas at present we sponsor destructive if entertaining fantasies that drive them 
straight to the syringe.”). 
254.  See, e.g., Dianna Kenny, Stairway to Hell: Life and Death in the Pop Music Industry, 
CONVERSATION (Oct. 27, 2014), http://theconversation.com/stairway-to-hell-life-and-death-in-the-
pop-music-industry-32735 (“Across the seven decades studied, popular musicians’ lifespans were up 
to 25 years shorter than the comparable US population. Accidental death rates were between five and 
10 times greater. Suicide rates were between two and seven times greater; and homicide rates were up 
to eight times greater than the US population.”). 
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deaths are greeted with romantic notions of celebrities joining “the dead 
rock star club”255 or proclamations that their work “lives on forever.”256 
Our culture repeatedly holds out the romantic myth of the celebrity artist 
emerging from nowhere, creators cling onto it, and when the myth takes 
its toll, most people shrug it off after a few weeks of dance parties and 
Spotify playlists.257 They’ve achieved the American Dream of fame and 
immortality, so there’s no need to feel guilty or complicit in their deaths.  
Surviving family members, however, are acutely aware of both the 
adversity that the decedents confronted during their lives and the dark side 
of celebrity romanticism. They are too often the living victims of a 
celebrity culture that rips families apart and then asks them to find solace 
in their daughter’s, mother’s, or sister’s subsequent beatification. 
Intellectual property provides one of the few realistic opportunities to push 
back against the cultural economies that routinely harvest creative labor 
and discard its laborers. Through IP, they can seek some measure of 
recognition, dignity, and fair treatment in death that was missing during 
life. As articulated by communications scholar Joli Jensen, “Posthumous 
fame allows celebrity figures to slip loose from the moorings of biography 
and geography, so they can better serve the current purposes of those who 
need them—to sell, to enjoy, to identify with, to interpret.”258 IP estates 
provide a biographical and geographical mooring for cultural symbols that 
transcend physical mortality, and they can help ensure that past 
mistreatments of actual human beings are not entirely overlooked as 
necessary byproducts of a robust public domain. 
                                                
255.  Jones, supra note 247, at 13 (“To again use Kurt Cobain’s death as an example, it is 
interesting that almost immediately after news of his death spread many began adding him to the ‘dead 
rock star club’ by assigning him a place alongside the likes of Jimi Hendrix, Janis Joplin, and Keith 
Moon.”). 
256.  See, e.g., Jeff Smith, Musicians Who Died in 2016: Music that Lives on for Eternity, 
BUFFALO CHIP: STURGIS RIDER NEWS (Apr. 21, 2016) http://www.buffalochip.com/NEWS-
INFO/News/Sturgis-Rider-News-Blog/ArtMID/2002/ArticleID/513/Musicians-Who-Died-in-2016-
Music-That-Lives-On-for-Eternity. 
257.  See Harris, supra note 253, at 623 (“We subscribe to a mythology of genius that takes a 
heavy toll on the health—indeed the very existence—of our artists, whom we grant the license to 
behave, to lead chaotic, undisciplined lives that often spin out of control . . . We are complicit in a 
holocaust of talent.”); see also DYER, supra note 243, at 7, 48 (describing the “myth of success” that 
allows everyday artists to rise to the top). 
258.  Joli Jensen, Posthumous Patsy Cline: Constructions of Identity in Hillbilly Heaven, in 
AFTERLIFE AS AFTERIMAGE: UNDERSTANDING POSTHUMOUS FAME 121, 139 (Steve Jones & Joli 
Jensen eds., 2005); see also Abigail Gardner, En’shrine’d: Ushering Fela Kuti into the Western ‘Rock’ 
Canon, in DEATH AND THE ROCK STAR 135, 136–37 (Catherine Strong & Barbara LeBrun eds., 2015) 
(describing the posthumous “containment and enshrinement” of Nigerian musician Fela Kuti to 
minimize his political activism and assimilate him into western music cannon); Regina Arnold, 
There’s a Spectre Haunting Hip-Hop: Tupac Shakur, Holograms in Concert and the Future of Live 
Performance, in DEATH AND THE ROCK STAR 177, 183 (Catherine Strong & Barbara LeBrun eds., 
2015) (“Shakur has been rendered harmless by mortality, technology and time.”). 
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Even if IP scholars remain skeptical of the role of heirs within the IP 
system, it is important to at least recognize just how challenging a position 
they are in. In the immediate aftermath of the decedent’s death, family 
members must process the loss of a loved one—often one who died young 
and/or tragically—in the midst of an onslaught of public attention and 
rapidly increased desire to spread the loved one’s image, words, and voice 
far and wide.259 From there, they must run what is essentially a family 
business that involves constantly balancing the financial opportunities of 
selling their family member’s image, words, and voice with the personal 
investments in moving forward with a sense of peace and stability.260  
The difficulty of this task is perhaps best illustrated by the increasingly 
important question about whether dead artists should be “resurrected” via 
CGI and hologram technologies. Most prominently, in the most recent 
Star Wars movie, Rogue One, actor Peter Cushing reprised his role as the 
sinister Grand Moff Tarkin, commander of the Death Star. Cushing, 
however, had been dead for over twenty years, and his estate was 
criticized for giving their approval to this “indignity”—“the reduction of 
the soul to regurgitated digital correspondence.”261 Tupac Shakur’s mother 
similarly has been criticized for permitting a “live” hologram performance 
at the 2012 Coachella Festival. The hologram performance was “implicitly 
violent”; “forcing the reanimated body in question to sign, dance and say 
words of someone else has overtones of puppetry, minstrelsy and voodoo, 
activities that have artistic and historical links to slavery.”262 On the flip 
side, when heirs, such as the Jimi Hendrix estate, deny permission for 
posthumous performances they view as degrading or cheapening, they face 
criticism of impeding the public domain and the decedent’s continued 
                                                
259.  Jones, supra note 247, at 7 (“[D]eath is a good career move as far as the music business is 
concerned. If nothing else, the publicity surrounding a performer’s death stimulates record sales.”); 
Scott K. Radford & Peter H. Bloch, Grief, Commiseration, and Consumption Following the Death of a 
Celebrity, 12 J. CONSUMER CULTURE 137, 140 (“As with saints and martyrs, death represents a 
common route to increased sacralization for celebrities and their related products.”). 
260.  For example, Professor Janne Mäkelä poses the question about whether surviving family 
members should allow posthumous duets or reunions, like Natalie Cole’s duet with the late Nat King 
Cole or the Beatles’ 1995 “virtual reunion.” On one hand, these are exciting new ways to pay tribute 
and celebrate the deceased star, but they are often dismissed as tacky publicity stunts, as “necropop.” 
Janne Mäkelä, Who Owns Him? The Debate on John Lennon, in AFTERLIFE AS AFTERIMAGE: 
UNDERSTANDING POSTHUMOUS FAME 171, 178–79 (Steve Jones & Joli Jensen eds., 2005). 
261.  Catherine Shoard, Peter Cushing Is Dead. Rogue One’s Resurrection Is a Digital 
Indignity, GUARDIAN (Dec. 21, 2016, 12:55 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016 
/dec/21/peter-cushing-rogue-one-resurrection-cgi; Zac Thompson, Digitally Reviving Peter Cushing 
for Rogue One is Disrespectful, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (Dec. 22, 2016, 6:06 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/zac-thompson/digitally-reviving-peter-cushing_b_13800074.html.  
262.  Arnold, supra note 258, at 180–81, 184 (noting that the same criticisms would apply to the 
holographic version of Michael Jackson used in Cirque du Soleil). 
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cultural vitality.263 If they broadly permit appropriation, they are enslaving 
the decedent to ongoing labor without consent. If they tightly restrict 
appropriation, they are enslaving the public domain.264 There may be, of 
course, a middle ground position, but finding the sweet spot is far from 
straightforward. 
And perhaps most importantly, they often did not ask for this. A 
shocking number of cultural icons died without a will, and IP rights passed 
solely by operation of intestacy laws. Martin Luther King, Jr., Marvin 
Gaye, Jimi Hendrix, Prince, Kurt Cobain, Tupac Shakur, Sonny Bono, and 
many other famous people died without wills and with a lucrative portfolio 
that passed to their closest family members, often in highly fractionated 
interests. For example, Prince died in 2016 without a will, spouse, or 
children, meaning that his copyright interests will be divided among one 
full sister and five half-siblings (and potentially the descendants of other 
putative half-siblings) 265—a very loose assortment of relatives now in 
charge of one of the most celebrated musical catalogs in history. Although 
these celebrities died intestate, many nevertheless diligently protected their 
intellectual property266—Sonny Bono even has a copyright statute named 
after him. The result has been the creation of valuable assets and the 
conscription of family members into managing those assets postmortem. 
IP heirs accordingly often face a daunting task of preserving a family 
member’s cultural legacy, in the face of lucrative commercial 
opportunities, in the context of premature death, and without prior 
consultation.267 IP law and scholarship could seek to improve and respond 
                                                
263.  See Teresa Méndez, The Day the Music Didn’t Die, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 12, 
2007), http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1012/p13s01-almp.html (“‘We kind of look at it as the 
karaoke version of playing with Jimi,’ says Ms. Hendrix, CEO of Experience Hendrix. ‘We try to keep 
things as authentically correct and as pure as possible’”); Sarah Kershaw, Rock Idol’s Legacy Devolves 
Into Family Feud, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/23/us/rock-idol-s-
legacy-devolves-into-family-feud.html (“And then there has been the growing criticism from fans and 
others over how Janie Hendrix, who won the rights to Hendrix's music and likeness in 1995 and now 
runs a company near here called Experience Hendrix, has marketed the image.”). 
264.  SAINT-AMOUR, supra note 52, at 214 (exploring “a certain structural homology between 
slavery and copyright” with respect to Alice Randall’s The Wind Done Gone). 
265.  See Christopher Watson, Minnesota Judge Drops 2 from Claim to Prince’s Estate, ABC 
(Oct. 27, 2016, 11:01 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/minnesota-judge-drops-claim-
princes-estate/story?id=43100385. 
266.  See, e.g., Thompson & Harris, supra note 181 (“People may not know that he litigated the 
‘I Have a Dream’ speech. Someone got copies of the speech and tried to market it. . . . We have tried to 
continue in his tradition.’”). 
267.  See, e.g., Demby, supra note 183 (“The death of a parent can be a calamity for anyone, but 
King's death was a generation-defining moment. King's children watched as their father increasingly 
belonged to everyone: a staple of history textbooks, an avatar for any cause deemed righteous, an 
evermore formless, affirming abstraction. King's heirs benefit from the expansion of that legacy, and 
are its legal custodians as well as real, flawed, not-always-noble human beings. It's no wonder the light 
cast on them can often look so unflattering.”). 
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to the difficult circumstances confronting IP estates, but too often it 
blames them for not doing a good enough job. 
At the same time, the framework I set forward here centers on parallel 
mourning; families and fans are mourning in distinct ways, but it is not 
just close relatives who experience a loss. Although, as explained above, it 
is important not to equate private and public mourning, the IP system does 
need to recognize the attachments that fans have to celebrities and popular 
culture. The attachments are highly mediated, but they are still real.268 In 
the aftermath of a celebrity death, fans gather together, both in person and 
online to share the integral role that a public figure or a song or a book 
played during their formative years;269 popular culture inscribes itself into 
our individual and collective identities, and the loss of the cultural figure 
can feel like a symbolic loss of the self.270 As articulated by sociology 
professor Margaret Gibson: 
Because so much of our identities and histories are forged through 
mediated culture, there are very profound, identifications that build 
up or carry though, often unconsciously, over-time. One can 
imagine a person who, upon finding out that a public figure or 
celebrity who shaped their memories of childhood died, being 
effected [sic] by this death because it renders fragile their own sense 
of mortality. . . .271 
In this context, the death of a celebrity provides an opportunity for 
collective memorializing and the reinforcement of communities of affinity 
during a time when many people are working through a sense of loss.272 
                                                
268.  See Radford & Bloch, supra note 259, at 151 (“As fans grieve for a celebrity they exhibit 
very real mourning behaviours and they look for product-relics to conserve the memory of the 
departed.”); Jones, supra note 247, at 11 (“Pop stars are seldom known personally by their audiences 
and yet many fans perceive their relationship with the star as being somewhat intimate.”). 
269.  See, e.g., George Kamberelis & Greg Dimitriadis, Collectively Remembering Tupac: The 
Narrative Mediation of Current Events, Cultural Histories, and Social Identities, in AFTERLIFE AS 
AFTERIMAGE: UNDERSTANDING POSTHUMOUS FAME 143, 153 (Steve Jones & Joli Jensen eds., 2005) 
(“Tupac’s life story and his music intermingled with the everyday lives of many different young 
people with a broad range of day-to-day concerns.”); Taylor Cole Miller, Social Sorrow: Tweeting the 
Mourning of Whitney Houston, in DEATH AND THE ROCK STAR 87 (Catherine Strong & Barbara 
LeBrun eds., 2015). 
270.  See Anu Harju, Socially Shared Mourning: Construction and Consumption of Collective 
Memory, 21 NEW REV. HYPERMEDIA & MULTIMEDIA 123 (2014).  
271.  Margaret Gibson, Death and Mourning in Technologically Mediated Culture, 16 HEALTH 
SOC. REV. 415, 421 (2007). 
272. Harju, supra note 270, at 139 (“[S]haring of commemorative content online gives a sense 
of mourning together.”); Julie L. Andsager, Altared Sites: Celebrity Webshrines as Shared Mourning, 
in AFTERLIFE AS AFTERIMAGE: UNDERSTANDING POSTHUMOUS FAME 17, 20 (Steve Jones & Joli 
Jensen eds., 2005) (“Webshrines seem to serve three basic functions: (1) building community among 
mourners; (2) negotiating conflicting feelings over the death; and (3) immortalizing and magnifying 
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As much as heirs feel like their family member’s legacy is being 
compromised or that their family is being mistreated, many fans are also 
experiencing a loss that often is insufficiently supported socially. 273 
Disruption of mourning through IP thus risks further disenfranchising a 
grieving process that is perhaps an inevitable byproduct of mass culture.274  
And speaking of mass culture, it is important not to overlook that 
mourning can be an incredibly lucrative business opportunity. “Individuals 
frequently react to death by spending money.”275 For example, following 
their deaths, Michael Jackson captured the top ten spots on the Billboard 
albums chart, 276  Whitney Houston held seven of the top ten spots on 
Amazon’s best seller list,277 and Prince’s sales surged 16,000 percent.278 
Celebrities can sometimes earn substantially more in death than in life, 
fueled by lucrative, nostalgia-rich ventures like Cirque du Soleil and 
Graceland, on top of diverse merchandising and advertising 
opportunities.279 Mourning, in other words, is big business, and there are a 
wide range of intermediaries ready and willing to facilitate collective 
memorialization. It may be tempting (and at times correct) to dismiss these 
commercial opportunities as crass commodification, but they nonetheless 
serve important purposes—they provide ample opportunities for 
communal mourning, which in turn can produce immense economic value 
for both businesses and surviving families.280  
After an artist’s death, there is undoubtedly a push-and-pull negotiation 
among family, fans, and businesses (plus journalists and scholars) about 
                                                                                                           
celebrity.”); Jensen, supra note 250, at xvii (“The image of Elvis is iconic—used by fans to construct 
‘a series of cultural and social practices that foster a sense of belonging . . . .’”). 
273.  Andsager, supra note 272, at 18 (“I argue that mourning the death of a beloved popular 
music star also constitutes disenfranchised grief.”). 
274.  See Mäkelä, supra note 260, at 185 (“John Lennon is not a ‘thing’ that a lawyer can give 
you permission to use, but rather John Lennon was a person, a real person, who left indelible imprint 
on a generation of people . . . that no lawyer can take away from us.”); Gibson, supra note 271, at 420 
(“When public/celebrity figures die what is lost is the link between collective myths and ideals, and 
their embodiment in real flesh and blood people.”). 
275.  Radford & Bloch, supra note 259, at 141. 
276.  Id. 
277.  Id. 
278.  Paul Schrodt, Prince Album Sales Surge 16,000% After His Death, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 26, 
2016, 5:06 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/prince-album-sales-after-death-2016-4. 
279.  See Dorothy Pomerantz, The Top-Earning Dead Celebrities, FORBES (Oct. 25, 2011, 10:43 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dorothypomerantz/2011/10/25/the-top-earning-dead-celebrities/ - 
1111dc756e9a.  
280.  See Radford & Bloch, supra note 259, at 150 (“Using products to assist in the grieving 
process was viewed as natural and positive by fans. However, there was a clear disdain for persons 
seeking to profit from Dale [Earnhardt’s] loss. There was an intriguing dichotomy: fans were highly 
interested in Earnhardt merchandise, but its purchase or sale for profit was criticized.”); Jensen, supra 
note 250, at xx (“Commercial processes are what make posthumous celebrity possible, what give fans, 
journalists, critics, and scholars the materials we use to tell ourselves stories.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss3/3
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how to define an artist’s legacy. 281  Disputes within and among these 
constituencies cannot be fully avoided, particularly where the private 
person and public persona were available to each group in highly 
divergent degrees. But by at least recognizing that diverse processes of 
mourning are at stake, the negotiations (both legal and cultural) can begin 
from a shared appreciation that everyone is participating in the messy task 
of constructing a person’s legacy. 282  Personal histories and public 
celebrations are both deeply important parts of constructing and preserving 
cultural legacy, and collaboration between fans, families, and 
intermediaries stand to be much more productive if they gave each other a 
chance. IP has a role in facilitating this parallel mourning by 
simultaneously giving the decedent’s family a prominent seat at the table 
while expressly limiting their ability to dictate cultural conversation about 
the deceased.  
Embracing the concept of parallel mourning involves embracing a set 
of interests often cast to the periphery of IP policy. There have recently 
been growing debates about whether noneconomic interests are “suspect” 
and accordingly whether courts should be skeptical of IP assertions rooted 
in a desire to maintain privacy or a good reputation.283 For IP estates, these 
concerns are often paramount, and the potential for IP to play a role in 
remedying past and ongoing exploitation and mistreatment should not be 
dismissed lightly. Particularly where some traditional justifications for IP 
have become highly suspect, 284  scholars would be well-served to 
acknowledge the work IP is already doing under the radar. Judges, juries, 
and lawmakers at least implicitly care about fairness in creative 
communities and facilitating the needs of surviving families.285  IP can 
                                                
281.  See Jensen, supra note 250, at xviii (“[F]ans, critics, and journalists generate a variety of 
conflicting stories of legacy. The struggle to ‘own’ a celebrity, especially after death, foregrounds the 
problematic difference between personal and familial claims, fan desires, and critical commentary on 
who can constitute the star’s legacy.”). 
282.  Jensen, On Fandom, supra note 250, at xix (“[F]amilies, fans, journalists, critics, and 
scholars are all in the same business of defining a legacy, even if they usually work at cross-purposes. . 
. . [I]n each case, we are laying claim to our own interpretation of what the celebrity’s life and death 
can and should tell us.”). 
283.  See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 18; M. Margaret McKeown, supra note 141, at 7 (describing 
a “fundamental mismatch” between the reputational claim in Garcia v. Google and the purposes of 
copyright); Margaret Chon, Copyright’s Other Functions, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 364, 366 
(2016) (“If we limit our understanding of legitimate goals of copyright protection to market actors or 
commercial ends, we are missing a lot of the copyright story, past and especially present.”). 
284.  See Mark Lemley, supra note 31; Brian L. Frye, Machiavellian Intellectual Property, 78 
U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (2016) (summarizing consequentialist/deonotologist debate that has followed 
Lemley’s article); Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Rational Faith: The Utility of Fairness in Copyright, 97 
B.U. L. REV. 1487 (2017). 
285.  See Bair, supra note 284, at 1506–08. 
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work to constrain socioeconomic forces that deny artists, celebrities, or 
their families recognition, privacy, or fair treatment. 
Questions of mourning trigger foundational questions about whether IP 
laws should care explicitly about the interpersonal relationships involving 
actual, flesh-and-blood authors or whether the primary focus should be on 
the circulation of their intangible work. Estates repeatedly use IP as a 
mechanism to address vulnerabilities and inequalities within systems of 
cultural production, but both courts and scholars are hesitant to expressly 
describe IP as a tool against exploitation. 286  Dominant notions of 
facilitating cultural “progress” are so linked with “forward”-looking 
innovation, production, commodification, and dissemination of creative 
works,287 that it can be difficult to accommodate the backwardness that 
often comes with death—looking back, grieving, and a sense of nostalgia 
for the past. It is certainly cleaner and easier to just say that these 
“regressive” human impulses are beyond the ken of the legal system, but it 
is important to at least grapple with the reality that the individuals 
impacted by IP systems are looking both forward and backwards.  
B. Doctrine 
How might IP law better accommodate a theory of parallel mourning? 
By recognizing that death triggers a range of challenging cultural and 
emotional processes, and not merely unbridled greed and irrationality, IP 
can both help rights holders become better stewards of the decedent’s 
legacy and steer stewardship towards individuals willing and able to take 
on this difficult cultural role.  
First, the most straightforward takeaway is it that estate planning needs 
to be much better integrated into IP management. Many of the problems 
surrounding estate ownership of IP emerge when the author takes all the 
necessary steps to secure their IP rights but fails to affirmatively decide 
who will be the proper steward for those rights after they die. Martin 
Luther King, Jr., for example, dutifully registered copyrights in his 
speeches but never left a will, and as a result his family is widely criticized 
for poor stewardship and infighting about access to and use of King’s 
image, work, and belongings. The absence of an estate plan creates 
coordination headaches among a slew of tenants-in-common and 
unsurprisingly magnifies the likelihood of friction among family members. 
                                                
286.  Cf. MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE (2012). 
287.  See Margaret Chon, Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent 
Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97 (1993). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss3/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] IP, R.I.P.   697 
 
 	
Given that copyright and (in many states) the rights of publicity subsist 
for many decades after death, questions about estate planning should be 
front and center when securing and transferring IP: What persons or 
charitable causes does the rights holder want to receive the economic 
benefits of postmortem rights? Who does the rights holder want to make 
decisions about how their work or image is used after they die? How can 
ownership and management authority be structured in life to minimize the 
disruption of death?288 These are standard estate planning questions that 
can give rise to postmortem ownership structures in which families can 
serve as beneficiaries, trustees, and/or outright transferees according to the 
particular wishes of the decedent. Although the decedent’s wishes can 
certainly produce suboptimal results for heirs or the broader society,289 
deliberate estate planning can at least limit the principal/agent and 
coordination problems that occur with pure reliance on intestate 
succession.290 
Registration is one place within the IP system where rights holders 
might be more forcefully nudged into deliberate estate planning. For 
example, when authors register copyrights (or, in a few states, when 
celebrities register their publicity rights),291 they might be expressly and 
explicitly notified that the rights they are registering will last for seventy 
years after they die, and accordingly they should consult with an estate 
planning attorney or otherwise adjust their wills or trusts to account for 
their postmortem copyright interest. A more significant step forward might 
be to allow IP registrants to expressly designate a postmortem transferee—
this designation might fill in gaps of estate plans that fail to mention IP 
rights or more modestly supplant state intestacy laws in the absence of a 
will.  
Another place to better incorporate estate planning is the Copyright 
Act’s termination of transfers provisions, which entitle an author or a set 
list of statutory successors—spouses, children, and grandchildren—to 
terminate any copyright license, sale, or transfer thirty-five years after 
execution. 292 The line of succession and voting proportions set forth in the 
Copyright Act cannot be altered through deliberate estate planning, 
                                                
288.  For example, the author might settle an inter vivos trust with themselves as a co-trustee and 
a lifetime beneficiary along with their family members; therefore, when the author dies, management 
of the trust property would remain relatively stable, as does the economic benefit to the family. 
289.  See generally Eva E. Subotnik, Artistic Control After Death, 92 WASH. L. REV. 253 
(2017). 
290.  See, e.g., Smolensky, supra note 207, at 800–01 (discussing problems with heirs acting as 
surrogate decisionmakers). 
291.  See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 482P-8 (2017). 
292.  17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304 (2012). 
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meaning that authors cannot deliberately centralize by will or trust all 
renegotiation powers in one child, sibling, or friend who is familiar with 
their work and the artistic community. 293 Moreover, if the author settled a 
trust to administer copyright issues before and after death, the statutory 
successors may terminate the transfer of copyright to the trust and upset a 
deliberate decision about who is best situated to steward the author’s 
legacy.294 For example, Ray Charles devised all of his IP interests to a 
charitable foundation in order to support research and scholarship grants 
for deaf, blind, and underprivileged youth; he separately provided 
$500,000 in trust for each of his children in exchange for waiving all 
rights as against the estate. Notwithstanding Charles’ deliberate plan for 
who should manage his estate—and for what purposes—seven of his adult 
children sought to terminate certain publishing agreements, which 
provided royalties to the foundation, and reclaim copyright for 
themselves.295 If Charles’ children ultimately prevail, the result will be 
highly fractured ownership and management of the musician’s work, 
expressly contrary to his desires. The termination of transfers provisions 
were ostensibly designed to protect authors and their successors from 
unequal or uncertain bargaining with corporate intermediaries,296 not to 
rigidly police authors’ estate planning.297 Lee-ford Tritt, Tonya Evans, and 
Bradley Greenberg have advocated reforms to the termination provisions 
to better respect intelligent estate planning;298 these reforms would help 
address the stewardship challenges raised by parallel mourning. 
Relatedly, estate planning in IP could also be encouraged more actively 
during licensing, corporate acquisitions, and accompanying due diligence. 
When entities are negotiating the transfer of an ownership interest in IP, 
particularly in copyright, the identity of the author’s heirs and successors 
can greatly affect the value of the rights they obtain. Although the 
termination of transfers provision again provides surviving spouses, 
children, and grandchildren an inalienable right to terminate a license or 
transfer, if none of these family members survive, termination rights vest 
                                                
293.  Tritt, supra note 24; see also Brad A. Greenberg, DOMA’s Ghost and Copyright 
Reversionary Interest, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 391 (2014). 
294.  See Evans, supra note 24. 
295.  See Ray Charles Found. v. Robinson, 795 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2015). 
296.  See Guy A. Rub, Stronger than Kryptonite? Inalienable Profit-Sharing Schemes in 
Copyright Law, 27 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 49, 78–79 (2013). 
297.  Evans, supra note 294, at 304 (“Congress did not intend for the right to prevent authors 
from making advantageous lifetime transfers into vehicles controlled by the author for prudent 
business, tax, and estate planning reasons. To the contrary, Congress sought to empower authors to 
reap the financial benefits the copyright exclusivity monopoly was intended to protect.”). 
298.  Tritt, supra note 24; Evans, supra note 294; Greenberg, supra note 293. 
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in the executor of the author’s estate.299 Accordingly, the existence and 
substance of an estate plan can matter greatly. For example, Prince was 
survived solely by siblings—none of whom may exercise termination 
rights—meaning that the executor of his estate ultimately decides whether 
to terminate his licensing deals and on what terms to renegotiate.300 He 
never indicated who he wanted to make these decisions, and his licensees 
and assignees are left ignorant as to whom they are likely to be negotiating 
with in coming years. When obtaining these rights, it would be incumbent 
to request estate planning documents or require that such plans be made. 
Second, the interests asserted by IP heirs map fairly poorly onto the 
remedies available for IP infringement. Contrary to the view that IP estates 
are trolling for licensing revenue, quite often the interests they are 
asserting—recognition, privacy, reputation—are very difficult to address 
through the monetary relief increasingly favored after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in eBay v. MercExchange.301 A few courts recently have held 
that, in a copyright dispute, the “irreparable harm” requirement for 
injunctive relief cannot be satisfied through a showing of privacy harms or 
emotional distress. These harms are “too attenuated from the purpose of 
copyright.”302 Several scholars, however, have recognized that many rights 
holders are not primarily concerned with monetary damages and want 
remedies that are typically unavailable in copyright—such as 
attribution. 303  IP estates in this regard may be no different. Family 
members repeatedly speak in terms of the lucrative licensing opportunities 
they turn down, so the prospect of money damages or a compulsory 
license304 fails to respond to the emotional interests often at stake in their 
disputes. These interests will often map far better onto injunctive forms of 
relief. 305  Ultimately, it is important that the remedies available for 
infringement actually reflect the needs of the individuals seeking relief 
                                                
299.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304 (2012). 
300.  See Britton Payne, Heirs Go Crazy: Prince’s Estate and Copyright’s Termination of 
Transfer, COPYRIGHT ON! (2016), https://paynebritton.wordpress.com/2016/05/23/heirs-go-crazy-
princes-estate-and-copyrights-termination-of-transfer/. 
301.  547 U.S. 388 (2006). See generally Andrew Gilden, Copyright Essentialism and the 
Performativity of Remedies, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1123 (critiquing the shift away from injunctive 
relief post-eBay). 
302.  Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 746 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Bollea v. Gawker 
Media, LLC, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2012). 
303.  See, e.g., SILBEY, supra note 26; Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual 
Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745 (2012). 
304.  See Arewa, supra note 14, at 348 (suggesting a liability rule for postmortem 
infringements); Spoo, supra note 13, at 1828. 
305.  Horton, supra note 209, at 597 (suggesting only injunctive relief for postmortem publicity 
violation). 
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through the legal system, and IP’s increased reliance on a liability rule 
creates an unfortunate wedge between the two.306 
Third, recognition of parallel mourning may provide some additional 
support for the much-criticized “life-plus-70” copyright term and often 
equivalently lengthy duration of publicity rights. Parallel mourning 
emphasizes that death is a significant event—both economically and 
culturally. From an economic perspective, the marked spike in revenues 
that often attends the death of an artist suggests that the “life-plus” 
structure is not an arbitrary means of setting a long term, but reflects an 
economically valuable moment that policymakers might want to allow 
rights holders to capture as an incentive to create. 307  Death also is a 
morally complex and emotionally charged moment in which questions of 
dignity and personhood are perhaps at their greatest, challenging the 
position that moral rights in creative works, if protectable at all, must 
extinguish upon the author’s death. 308  The narratives deployed by IP 
estates surveyed in Part II, particularly in conjunction with the insights of 
trusts and estates scholars surveyed in Part III, demonstrates that many of 
the interests protected by moral rights—recognition, dignity, integrity—
continue beyond death among individuals who maintain close emotional 
bonds to the author. And importantly, these bonds are not ephemeral, but 
continuing.309 Mourning is not about a short period of coming to grips with 
the death of a loved one and moving on. It is about integrating the loss and 
legacy of that person into the life narratives of future generations.310 A 
“life-plus-many-decades” term, while rightfully associated with a wide 
range of economic and cultural costs, at least has the benefit of being 
consistent with evolving notions of mourning and the cultural, economic, 
and emotional significance of death.  
Finally—and perhaps most difficult—how should courts respond in the 
inevitable event that the interests of estates, more sympathetically recast 
above, collide with the interests of downstream authors and audiences? Of 
                                                
306.  See generally Gilden, supra note 301 (critiquing copyright law’s increasing embrace of 
liability rules). 
307.  Jeanne Fromer has relatedly suggested that the “life-plus” structure of copyright may 
provide an “expressive incentive” to authors—the life-plus-seventy term of protection expressly 
recognizes the importance of actual human authors within the copyright regime, thereby encouraging 
them to participate in cultural production. Fromer, supra note 303, at 1802–03 (“Keying duration to 
the work's creation or registration, as was once done, signals the work's importance at the author's 
expense. The current durational structure, by contrast, assures the author that protection will attach for 
the author's lifetime (and then some).”). 
308.  See supra notes 33–36 (moral rights scholarship). 
309.  See, e.g., Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 206, at 505 (“This process of self-understanding 
[enabled by inheritance laws] does not end on a particular date . . . .”).  
310.  See supra notes 238–39. 
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utmost importance, the concept of parallel mourning requires 
acknowledging both the interests of family members in controlling third-
party uses and the interests of fans, scholars, and journalists in actively 
engaging with the decedent and their work. In this respect, parallel 
mourning is entirely consistent with—indeed it mandates—a robust fair 
use defense in copyright and related free speech defenses to the right of 
publicity. Family mourning should not be a complete defense to truthful 
reporting about the decedent’s legacy, a critical interpretation of the 
decedent’s work, or a fan’s celebratory reworking.  
Fair use and the First Amendment are, at their core, a balance between 
the expressive interests of the defendant and the harms that expression 
causes the plaintiff. This balancing, however, should be explicit and 
transparent about what interests are really at stake. Courts should not shy 
away from recognizing—and even empathizing with—an heir’s interest in 
protecting reputation, dignity, or privacy. 311  Although in many 
circumstances (e.g., criticism, parody, and artistic expression) these 
interests might ultimately need to give way to truthful and open cultural 
discourse, they nonetheless can provide at least a modest thumb on the 
scale in favor of the estates. Quite often IP estates are concerned with a 
lack of recognition for the decedent, suggesting—as other scholars have—
that the absence of attribution should weigh against fair use (and its 
presence should weigh in favor of it). 312  Additionally, where family 
privacy concerns are most heightened (e.g., the disclosure of unpublished 
manuscripts and letters) the analysis above lends further support to 
                                                
311.  A good recent example of a judicial opinion expressly recognizing the interests of heirs but 
ultimately dismissing their claims on fair use grounds involved the rapper Drake’s sampling of a 
spoken-word track by the deceased jazz musician Jimmy Smith. Estate of Smith v. Cash Money 
Records, Inc., No. 14-cv-02703, 2017 WL 2333770 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2017). In that case, the court 
expressly engaged plaintiffs’ argument that “the use cannot be transformative because the copied 
portions are not readily identifiable as [the sampled track] and because the track does not identify 
Jimmy Smith.” Id. at *8. The court ultimately rejected this argument in light of Drake’s alteration of 
the underlying track’s criticism of rap to an express celebration of rap’s endurance. Id. at *8–9. 
Although I disagree with the court’s rhetorical reliance on Drake’s use of the track as “raw material” 
for his work, the court at least engaged with the plaintiffs’ desires to have their family member more 
expressly recognized, but ultimately decided that Drake’s critical, expressive interests outweighed 
them. See Gilden, supra note 137. 
312.  See Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L. 
REV. 41 (2007) (proposing a fifth fair use factor that considers whether the defendant gave attribution 
to the author of the work); Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New 
Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651, 680 (1997) (arguing that the presence of disclaimers 
should influence fair use determinations). As Rebecca Tushnet has argued, however, the 
presence/absence/relevancy/sufficiency of attribution is likely to be highly context-specific and 
resistant to clear-cut rules. Rebecca Tushnet, Naming Rights: Attribution and Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 
789 (2007). 
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existing limitations on fair use for private or unpublished materials.313 
Lastly, as I have argued elsewhere, courts in copyright and right of 
publicity cases might focus less on whether a work is “transformative” 
from the perspective of the reasonable audience member and more on the 
material impact of the challenged use on the rights holder. 314  The 
“transformative use” inquiry has diverted attention away from the actual 
ethical, economic, and cultural stakes at issue in copyright and publicity 
rights disputes, masked the cultural dialogue that exists within 
appropriative uses, and has had a tendency to disproportionately benefit 
famous authors when they appropriate from others. 315  The 
“metaconsideration”316 of transformative use accordingly makes it difficult 
to introduce the diverse range of interests asserted by IP estates into actual 
litigation. Particularly where IP purports to rely heavily on case-by-case 
balancing of each side’s interest, IP doctrine should provide ample 
opportunity for both plaintiffs and defendants to tell their story, so that 
both the doctrine and the discourse evolves in a manner that reflects and 
responds to the real-world struggles over crafting a cultural legacy. 
 
CONCLUSION  
Death inevitably upends economic support systems, alters social 
circles, and imposes substantial emotional burdens on those who need to 
come to terms with the loss of another person. The wider the decedent’s 
social circle and the broader the decedent’s cultural impact, the more 
complex and contentious their death becomes.  
For the families and friends of individuals in creative fields, intellectual 
property can serve as a valuable tool in managing the messy tasks of 
mourning and moving forward. IP estates are by no means perfectly 
selfless stewards acting nobly in service of their loved one’s legacy. But 
they are also not the greedy, despotic rent-seekers too often portrayed in IP 
debates. Instead, they are a diverse group of individuals, with a complex 
                                                
313.  See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985) 
(rejecting fair use defense when The Nation released excerpts from Gerald Ford’s unpublished 
autobiography); Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1176, 1183 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Maya's 
purpose in publishing the photos was to expose the couple's secret wedding, which was at odds with 
the couple's purpose of documenting their private nuptials. . . . Maya's effort to document its exposé 
does not automatically trump the couple's rights in its unpublished photos.”). 
314.  Gilden, supra note 137, at 403–406. 
315.  Id. 
316.  Peter Jaszi, Is There Such a Thing as Postmodern Copyright?, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 105, 115 (2009). 
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mix of economic and emotional investments, who use the tools at hand to 
navigate incredibly thorny issues of death, fame, money, and cultural 
legacy.  
For those individuals whose cultural contributions have been widely 
acknowledged, IP can help surviving families traverse the onslaught of 
attention and commercialization that attends the death of a celebrity. For 
those individuals whose cultural impact was substantial but 
unacknowledged, IP can help surviving families inscribe the decedent’s 
rightful place in cultural history. For those individuals who suffered 
greatly in the creation of their cultural legacy, IP can help make sure that 
their struggle is not forgotten. For some families, IP allows their loved 
ones to finally rest in peace.  
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